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This text is a draft of the fifth chapter of an upcoming book on ex-
planatory, interpretative understanding approaches to social studies 
in general and case studies in particular. 
The first chapter, “Coming to terms”, deals with language, induc-
tion, deduction and our uncertain grasp of realities. 
The second is “Truth - a concept of imagination with many faces”. 
Both are now available as Working Paper 2005-2: “Coming to Terms 
and Truth”. 
The third, “In case of Case Research”, on different approaches 
within social research to generalization, self-awareness and nearness 
to field of study, is available as Working Paper 2004-9. 
The fourth, “Modes of Interpretation”, a long-time story of making 
sense either by overexpansion or playful experiments of coming to 
terms with realities, is available as Working Paper 2007-1. 
The sixth, on “Understanding”, is finished in a rough copy and 
deals with coping, bestowment, narratives and emancipation. It is 
expected to be available in Spring 2008. 
All working papers are available on request by contacting either the 
author, e-mail: erm@asb.dk, or Lisbeth Widahl, e-mail: liw@asb.dk.  
I would like to thank my colleagues in general for their support 
during the writing of this manuscript. 
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 WHAT A WAR CRY: “LET’S OUST INTERPRETATION 
AND OPT FOR ‘OBJECTIVITY’ IN SOCIAL 
RESEARCH!” 
People seem to have no problem finding reasons for their beliefs as 
a means of strengthening them, be it in a parallel spiritual world or 
in atheism; in the delights or the devious powers of capitalism; in 
liberalism or carefully engineered utopias. Such inconsistencies have 
since antiquity inspired more empirically bent individuals to de-
velop a Science founded on direct “data” generation and disen-
gaged, logical analysis. Theory development should simply be in-
dependent of the whims, biases or will to believe of any individual, 
however strongly he or she may claim to be a researcher. 
Thus, perceptions of intervention by the Godly, romancing on the 
spirit in Nature, the search for the essence and/or purpose of life, 
idolizing the rights of man and not the least after-the-fact specula-
tions on motivation have to veer and make space for an approach, 
where statements claiming to be scientific have to be presented in a 
way that allows others to test them.  
So advocates of explanatory studies claim we should approach sub-
jects we want to examine from the outside1 by collecting “data” 
either directly by sight, see page 11->, WP Coming to T & T, or indi-
rectly by means of measuring instruments. “Data” must be based on 
publicly available evidence and not be obtained by feeling, subjec-
tive sense-making, imagination or what some “expert” or visionary 
with a twisted mind may believe. The question is just how well-
founded explanatory practices themselves are within the Social 
Sciences.  
So let us take a look at how and why interpretations are rejected and 
what a full-blown explanatory approach to Social Science could en-
tail. 
                                           
 




Reactions to the practice of interpretation 
As with other ideologies, “adherents of explanatory practices” are 
prone to bolster their practices by degrading their alleged oppo-
nents. Hence the war cry: “Interpretations are fraught with ‘Subjec-
tivism’ – and consequently we are led to believe that explanations 
are not.  
As a term of abuse to debase others, “Subjectivism” may be hard to 
define, yet in ordinary terms it entails a claim that: 
•  The perspective of the Other is founded on intentionally selected 
facts as well as on analyses tainted by personal likes and dislikes. 
Not because people are malicious as such, they just give in to per-
sonal bias, as it is called.  
Or in even more derogatory terms, in order really to defame others: 
•  The views of the Other are by intent tainted by economical inter-
est, ideological partisanship or desire to please a powerful person 
as gatekeeper for one’s future, i.e. agent bias, see page 12 WP 
Modes of I. 
When under attack for being – as in this case “subjective” – those 
touched may say: “Yes, certainly,” and then choose to redefine the 
term in a positive way. Thus, in philosophical terms, Subjectivism2 
may become a self-conscious and self-assured claim with a wide 
range of nuances. As such, it includes: 
•  An uneven array of idealist philosophies stretching from the 
claim that i) “all” that we can and do know is what comes to our 
mind, to ii) the admittance of no reality other than that of the 
thinking subject itself, which then iii) is perceived as a world 
creator.3   
                                           
 
 
3 As a philosophy, “Subjectivism” is associated with such diverse thinkers as e.g. 
empiricists like Hume, rationalists like Descartes. Cognition has to be founded in 
subjects’ (intellectual) self-awareness or in idealists like J.G. Fichte. The foundation 
of knowledge is the creative activity of the subject herself, etc.  






In this essay, though, we take a somewhat, if not different, then 
more specific stand: First we should acknowledge that we do per-
ceive the world in our own individual ways. If this is the case, 
problems occur only in so far as we deny our potential for being bi-
ased. 4 Thus we will align subjectivism  as expressed, in particular, in 
the form of “spontaneous subjectivism” – see page 13 in WP Modes 
of Interpretation – with naive realism. In this context, subjectivism is 
expressed as a “taken-for-granted” belief that what “I” sense is go-
ing on within someone else is what is really happening within that 
person, – that “I” can immediately sense, from his facial expressions, 
posture and actions, what is going on within him and even why. 
In this essay, subjectivity is thus related to the circumstances sur-
rounding our own life stories, see page 11 WP Modes of I, and thus 
if you insist, linked to our biases. 
The call for explanation as a means of clearing up the mess of subjective 
beliefs of others 
Adherents of the objectivity claim can easily pinpoint a multitude of 
conflicting interpretations of interrelated events. There is hardly any 
limit to the number of interpretations some have taken to be true, 
while others have enjoyed discarding them in disgust. It is as if any 
interpretation has a complementary scheme, see FIGURE INT.  
 
                                           
 
4 We will later – in the chapter on understanding – elaborate on the notion of 
subjectivity and introduce an additional concept “suspended” subjectivity, related 




FIGURE INT:  
COMPLEMENTARY INTERPRETATIVE SCHEMES 
 
Most interpretative schemes – if not all – seem to have their 
own counterpart, like seemingly opposing concepts such as 






Structuralism: Our acts 
are determined by lan-
guage etc. 
 
Man is essentially, if not 
evil, at least sinful (Lu-
theranism) 
 
Man is rational/can 
make rational decisions 
 
 
Hedonism: Man is 







Existentialism: Man is, at least in 
principle, responsible for his own fate  
 
Man is good (as claimed by social 
democratic exponents for the welfare 
state) 
 
Beyond awareness, man is dominated 
by emotional drives, be it lust 
(Freudianism) or greed (Economical 
man) 
 
Indulgence in pleasure is sinful; an 
ascetic lifestyle is to be preferred  
 
Adherents of any of these positions may all be able to point 
towards illustrative samples of evidence to “prove” how 
acceptable their particular conviction is! Thus, we may well 
wonder what could be the “subjective” and/or sociological 
drives lurking beneath a given devotion to defend any of 
these classical positions in opposition to others. Or it serves 
us well to illustrate man’s inclination – grounded in 






With this mess of possible stances, it is hardly surprising that some 
of us opt for a cool explanatory approach as a means of coming to 





A HISTORICAL VIEW FROM INSIDE: ON THE ROLE 
OF EXPLANATION WITHIN SOCIAL RESEARCH 
The “truest” cause 
The Greek historian, Thucydides5, may not have been the first, but 
he was certainly the most outstanding researcher to search for ex-
planations grounded in “this world” in order to spell out what and 
why events had to occur as they did. 
Instead of envisioning that the Gods – as imagined by the poet 
Homer – interfere in human strife, Thucydides instructs us “1) to 
look for facts and notice 2) how eyewitnesses each have their own 
interests to defend as well as deficiencies of memory.  
In order to commit ourselves to the future generations we should 3) 
avoid patriotic storytelling; even if this may be most enjoyable to 
our audience. Instead we should just 4) judge the evidence in accor-
dance with human nature and how events occur and reoccur in 
similar and comparative ways.”6. 
Thucydides thus recommends us to engage in 5) comparative analy-
sis of otherwise similar cases to identify why something happens 
again and again. This outlines the entire explanatory paradigm, in-
cluding its implicit assumptions: 
a) Search for “data”, which by implication are assumed to be indis-
putable (yet ref page 14 WP Coming to T & T; 
evaluate “them”, as we should be aware of how our informants 
might be biased as well as having a tendency to “forget”.  
Then in our analysis we should: 
c) Rely on our knowledge of human nature and 
                                           
 
5 Former strategos, chosen to lead an arm of the Athenian army 424 BC. Later author of 
The Peloponnesian War. Mainly a fight between Athens – as a democratic state and as 
a power at sea, head of her own league of Ionian islands – and Sparta as an 
oligarchy with at that time the strongest land-based army and herself head of most 
of the Peloponnesian states, 431-404 BC 




d) Compare what is similar and what differs in order to reach gen-
eralized principles for why events occur (causality). 
This approach does, in fact, express what were to become accepted 
as the general assumptions behind explanatory rhetoric in general: 
a) “Data” are there to be picked and b) whereas the people involved 
may be biased, c) the social researcher is all the wiser as he or she 
knows human nature, just as the doctor knows best about health 
and sicknesses.7 Thus, knowledge of human nature, together with d) 
identification of what is similar in repeated events enables us to 
propose generalized principles (by induction as we say today, see 
page 13 WP Coming to T & T, which in turn enable us to explain 
future happenings as well. 
Yet there is more to it. The very first example Thucydides gives – 
explaining the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War – is one of de-
ductive reasoning. After informing us that after thirty years of 
peace, Athens and Sparta were at war again, he says the following: 
“I consider the truest cause – and the one least openly expressed – to 
be that the increasing Athenian greatness and the resulting fear 
amongst the Spartans made their going to war inevitable. 8 9 
Apparently historians, working in the explanatory mode, should, as 
the quote shows, be able to identify the “truest cause” despite what 
others may believe, including the participants.10  
I leave it to the readers to struggle with the implicit meaning of 
“truest”. Here it is more important to note that Thucydides does not 
state the principle of inference he applies, which may be something 
like: “Take two strong, yet weakly connected powers operating 
within the same environment. If one sees that the other may be 
                                           
 
7 For a discussion of the methodological parallel between the study of social life 
according to Thucydides and Medicine as a Natural Science, see E. Badian: From 
Plataea to Potidaea, Johns Hopkins University Press, USA, 1993, Chapter 4. 
8 Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, book 1, #23. 
9 For the idea that History like any Natural Science should formulate general laws and 
means of identifying when to apply them (opus operandi), see Carl Hempel: “The 
Function of General Laws in History” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York, 
Free Press, 1942, pages 231-43. 




likely to grow so strong that it could later defy the other, it would be 
better to attack the rival before it is too late”.11 This outlines a strat-
egy like that of pre-emptive war or strike, as it was later to be 
launched by President Bush in 2002, after the September 11 disas-
ter.12 
 It is worth noting, though, that Thucydides, in the paragraph al-
luded to above,13 takes us even one step further, as he warns us that: 
Social researchers should be aware of not only the biases of our in-
formants, but also of our own biases, including the temptation to 
please our audience.14 15  
Thus, the only way to combat bias, defined as “subjectivity”, is not 
just to be observant of the Other, but to be constantly on the lookout 
for preferences, likes and dislikes which one has not yet recognized 
within oneself. 
The refusal to acknowledge interpretations 
– Some facets from the history of social research since Thucydides 
The growth of Industrialism, founded as it was in Chemistry and 
Physics, relied on the creation of knowledge based on observation 
and a logico-mathematical treatment thereof. What mattered was 
applicability and, thus, the ability to forecast. Consequently, reliabil-
ity was emphasised: Any researcher investigating the same subject 
should and must reach the same conclusion in order to be con-
                                           
 
11 Of course, one can state that however much Thucydides may have seen himself as 
one who explained events, as a historian he is a narrator. For this aspect, one might 
consult Tim Rood: Thucydides, narrative and explanation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1998. His discussion of other causes, sheds light on Thucydides’ use of the 
expression “the truest cause”. 
12 See e.g. Article 51, UN Charter, latest version of October 2000. 
13 Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, book 1, #23, 
14 For an alleged example of this, remember the accusations made against M. Mead, see 
page 98 WP Modes of I 
15 Ideals may serve you well, believing yourself free from bias, but hardly not. So the 
point here is not to discuss whether Thucydides himself was biased and how, i.e. as 
referred to by Tim Rood: Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation, Clarendon Press, 




sidered a scientist worth listening to. Thus, the ethos of interpreta-
tion was discarded outright.  
This explanatory ethos was later transferred to social research as 
well, mainly by: 
•  The enlightened founders of Positivism, Comte and Durkheim in 
France; 
•  The more austere Austrian-Anglo-American Approach, Logical 
Positivism;  
Both being related to the Logical Empiricism of John Locke and, in 
part, to the logically structured thinking by John Stuart Mill. 
Positivism (Auguste Comte) 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) claimed Positivism to be the basis for em-
pirical Sociology.16 Yet, it is worth recalling how his authorship of 
ideas reaches far beyond the boundaries of Positivism as it was to be 
radicalized and narrowed down in the century that followed. Thus, 
it is with regret that were here have to confine ourselves to touching 
only on his defining characteristics of the type of Social Research he 
helped establish, based primarily on the concept of the Natural 
Sciences as the ideal for the Social Sciences.  
Comte envisions his time to be on the verge of a new era. He first 
recalls how natural and social phenomena have initially been ex-
plained as acts of God and later by referring to the inherent nature 
of things.17 Now, as he says, Science is to be grounded – not on wish-
ful beliefs and rhetorical tricks – but on observation and reason 
alone. To underscore this break with the past, Comte introduces the 
term “positive”, as a rhetorical connotation, to emphasize the blissful, 
constructive spirit of this new era to come. 
                                           
 
16 Cours de Philosophie Positive, Six Volumes, Bachelier, 1830-1842. The very word 
Sociology is introduced in 4´th Tome, leçon 47, page 252. Below, though, I will refer 
to Auguste Comte: Positive Philosophy, translated by Harriet Martineau, London, 
1853, where Sociology is mentioned in Book VI, Chapter II, page 58. 
17 For an example, please see Aristotle and his “explanation” as to why things fall, ref 




His new programme called for: 
•  Observation to be the foundation for all Sciences, 
•  The aim of research to be the search for invariable laws for natural 
as well as social phenomena, including an acute awareness of cir-
cumstantial evidence, 
•  All Sciences are, as a whole, to be embedded in an all-encom-
passing, interdependent, hierarchical structure of levels – very 
similar to the approach already illustrated in Figure LEVRAN, page 
32 WP Modes of I, and 
•  Each Science – at least for the moment – is to be expected to have 
a logic of its own. Yet, the logic of those at a higher level must not 
contradict those at lower levels; 
•  An idea of progress of Science and, in consequence, society. 
 
Observation is to be the starting point and foundation any Science. 
Only fact should count, not imaginary first principles. There can be 
no real knowledge, but that which is based on observed “data”. Yet, 
he adds that it is equally true that “data” cannot be observed with-
out the guidance of some theory.18  
What we see depends on what we already believe. Thus, the belief 
in the interventions of the Gods is self-fulfilling; if you believe in 
them, you shall see them. Positive philosophy is now going to break 
the spell of all such vicious circles of self-confirmation. In future, 
Science has to be grounded in the search for invariable natural laws. 
These will include laws of “Social Physics” that will prove them-
selves in action and through experimentation.19 
In other words, scientific notions should be grounded entirely in the 
world of the real, beyond language. Measurement should break the 
                                           
 
18 Auguste Comte, op. cit. op., Vol. 1, Book I, page 3 & Vol. 2, Book VI, chapter iii, page 
97. 
19 Auguste Comte, op. cit.op. cit., Vol. 1, Book 1, page 12, see also Vol. 2, Book VI, 




spell of “seeing what you believe”. Yet it would not be easy. 
“Statesmen still suppose that social phenomena can be modified at 
will, the human race being always ready to yield to any influence of 
the legislator, spiritual or temporal, provided he is invested with 
sufficient authority.” 20 As, for example, when the Norwegian Parlia-
ment decided two generations ago that Hell no longer existed in 
Norway.  
However well-meaning or authoritarian the regime, social phe-
nomena cannot just be modified at the will of politicians, as Comte 
states. A lesson well learned, yet written in blood by those who have 
struggled under regimes of National and Soviet Socialism. Yet there 
are rules even rulers have to obey to ensure human dignity!21 
 
Science as organized hierarchy:  Comte envisions how the Sciences 
could emerge as a levelled unity. Social Science should build upon 
its antecedent, Biology, which in turn must build upon Chemistry 
etc. Yet, Comte did not foresee – as the logical positivists later did – 
that the more complex Sciences, level by level, could readily be re-
duced to the simpler. Nor did he believe the same laws of per-
formance to be applicable to any society. How a society is organized 
depends on climate, type of technology, religion etc. But he stressed 
that we should not admit any view on a higher level, e.g. Sociology 
that contradicted known laws at the more simple level, e.g. laws of 
human nature.22 
As for logic, there must be one common to all Sciences, Comte states. 
But it cannot be expressed in the same manner in every science. 
According to level of complexity, each Science must have its own 
way of establishing truth and rules of consistency.  
                                           
 
20 See Auguste Comte, op. cit.op. cit., Vol. 2,  Book IV, op. cit. page 72.  
21 Paraphrase, refer to Auguste Comte, op. cit.op. cit., Vol. 2,  Book IV, op. cit. page 70-4 
or Tome IV, Leçon 48 op. cit., page 288 – 470. 




Physics deals with simple relations and may, as such, be subject to 
more simple mathematical treatments.23 The fields of Biology and 
Social Sciences are too complex for that. Here, a comparative ap-
proach is more likely to be fruitful. Comparing one organism with 
another can show us which organs have similar functions and which 
do not – for instance how birds process food in comparison with 
reptiles and mammals. Thus, we may also learn to identify the key 
characteristics of differences between healthy and sick individuals 
and even learn to identify the causes of illness.  
Or we may, by cross comparison, observe how different societal 
structures develop under diverse geographical conditions.24 Or as 
Socrates said: Most people would define knowledge as the ability to 
tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from 
all others. 25 
Making comparisons is something we all do. Yet, Social Science 
should do it explicitly and with the greatest attention to detail, as 
illustrated by Stuart Mill’s model for the experimental design. 
 
Natural Science as the ideal for social research: In the early 19th century, 
social researchers were as adversarial to each other as they are to-
day. In his time, Comte predicted that this would come to an end. 
He believed that social research as a positive philosophy would 
progress and lead us to more specific insights, founded as they 
would be – not on the opinions of individual “researchers” – but on 
systematic “data” collection and progressive comparison.  
Accordingly, one body of “Social Physics” of invariable laws – as for 
the Natural Sciences – would be expected to emerge as circum-
stances of societies were identified. Thus, in order to improve Social 
Science, the training of social researchers should begin with courses 
                                           
 
23 Auguste Comte, op. cit., Vol. 2 VI, Chapter iv. 
24 Auguste Comte, op. cit., Vol. 2, Book VI, Chapter iii, op. cit. page 103 




in Natural Science, as is more than amply illustrated in Cours de 
Philosophie Positive.26 
Whatever the virtues involved, we should always bear in mind that 
any idea that the methods of Natural Science may or should be 
transferable to social research is, in itself, only legitimized by the 
interpretation that is possible as well as desirable! 
Positivism as shaped by the founder of Functionalism, Durkheim 
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) – as much as his Master Comte – be-
lieved in a Sociology grounded in observations with Natural Science 
as the ideal, in contrast to the lot of religious, romantic or unabashed 
subjectivist and untestable interpretations by which academics had 
hitherto let themselves be ensnared.  
And nor did he believe in the “unprepared mind”. Durkheim was 
painfully aware of how we are born into society and subsequently 
“most of our ideas and our inclinations are not developed by our-
selves, but come to us from without.”27 These, “our” conceptions of 
life and patterns of behaviour, are – as he stated – imposed upon us 
with a force we hardly recognize. It works by implication. First we 
are given and acquire an ordinary language; later the languages of 
law, politics and commerce.28 Generally, this moulding of our minds 
tends to be associated with learning, even when it is simply the re-
sult of social circumstance. Thus, to free himself, the sociologist 
should “put himself in the same state of mind as the physicist”, 
meaning: outside language.29 
                                           
 
26 I would love to refer to the later work of Comte, but I must leave this to another. Yet 
the richness of most “Master Thinkers” is fascinating compared to how little of their 
work survives in public awareness. Yet for an overview of Comte’s subsequent 
moral and aesthetic work, see i.e. Harald Høffding: History of Modern Philosophy, 
(1895), London, 1900, Book 9. 
27 Emile Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Thought (1895) Free Press, New York, 1938, 
page 4. Please notice that I have chosen to translate “tendances” as inclinations 
instead as tendencies, cf. Le regles de la methode sociologique, Press Universifiare de 
France, page 6. 
28 Truncated quote. 




Physicists approach nature with an open, inquiring mind, devoid of 
ideological or personal interests, he says. And should “they” intro-
duce any thoughts of their own, nature would resist any such inter-
pretations. Thus, the real social scientist should be prepared for 
“discoveries, which will surprise and disturb him”.30 
Social scientists in the Durkheimian sense, thus, have to abstain 
from “top-down” reasoning and from perceiving anything through 
the concepts given to us. Instead, we should base our analysis on 
“bottom-up” identification and comparison of “data” collected from 
the social domain. Replace ideological schemes with a Science 
grounded in realities! Or as he puts it: “Ideas and concepts, what-
ever name given to them, are not legitimate substitutes for (social 
facts as) things”.31 
Thus the first rule of Durkheim: 
•  All preconceptions must be eradicated.32 We have to emancipate 
ourselves from the fallacious ideas that dominate the mind of 
the layman, from political and religious beliefs to moral con-
cerns and emotional sentiment. 
Whereas his first rule is negative, his second is positive: 
•  Define social “data” in ways that are recognizable to others, i.e. 
not in moral terms, but by appearance. Thus, for instance, crimi-
nal acts are defined as acts which society will punish, just like 
chairs may be defined as man-made artefacts for sitting. 
 
Positivism, for Durkheim as for Comte, is related to what we osten-
sibly can point at and measure.33 And should we fail to get hold of 
what we are searching for, the “real” is expected to resist any inade-
                                           
 
30 Similarly, should the social researcher make himself vulnerable to guidance from the 
field, this is one of the tenets of research in the understanding mode, as we shall see 
in a later section. 
31 Emile Durkheim: The Rules .. op. cit., 15. 
32 It is fascinating how Positivism and Phenomenology share this claim while defining 
themselves in opposition to each other. 




quate, preliminary notions of ours. By contrast adherents of lofty 
metaphysical, idealistic and/or spiritual notions of reality do not lay 
themselves open to reality tests! 
Yet, practice shows how difficult it is just to stick to what is directly 
noticeable. And Durkheim, himself, had a hard time doing so too. In 
his own grand work on Suicide, for example, he offered this defi-
nition of his subject matter:34 
The term suicide is applied to all cases of death resulting directly or 
indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, 
which he knows will produce this outcome.35 36 
This is hardly objective in the above sense: The dead cannot tell us 
why they died the way they did. We can only infer what happened 
– in this case an alleged suicide – from “data” we take as reference 
for evidence. 
This objection should not lead us away from recognizing how his 
definition could be regarded as objective in another sense – that of 
no emotional involvement. According to the New Testament, Jesus – 
Blessed be His Name – knew his last acts would lead to his exe-
cution. Thus, according to the definition above, he committed sui-
cide. A disturbing thought? If so, it would be wrong to let our own 
feelings of reverence for Christ colour or, even worse, shape the 
definition of suicide! According to Durkheim, the death of Christ 
would be an ideal example of what he calls an altruistic suicide. 
This must suffice. Primarily because we have to turn to a powerful 
lesson which Durkheim taught us, and which, regrettably, is all too 
often overlooked as the second bearing concept in Positivist studies: 
                                           
 
34 Emile Durkheim: Suicide – Study in Sociology, (1897), Illinois 1951. 
35 Indirect in the sense that some traffic accidents may be concealed acts of suicide. 
36 Positive or negative: Positive should perhaps be translated as direct in the sense of 
actively doing something, i.e. taking poison. Negative could, thus, be called indirect in 
the sense of doing something that might induce others to kill you, e.g. martyrs, soldiers 




Functionalism – How an institution works and how it came to be 
Social institutions do exist. Why? Children can tell you the fire bri-
gade is there to put out fires, just as hospitals are there to cure the 
sick. The reason for the existence of social institutions is the very 
purpose they serve. So just like we attribute motives to men as the 
raison d’être for their acts, we attribute purposes to institutions.  
There is just one problem, as Durkheim reminds us: We cannot ex-
pect everyone to agree on what function a given institution serves or 
should serve! For instance, what is the role of “putting criminals be-
hind bars”? Revenge, punishment, calming the public, re-education, 
or…? I leave it to you to pick the interpretation you prefer. Thus, the 
sheer identification of a purpose is not enough to make Functional-
ism explanatory! 
Consequently – as demonstrated by Durkheim – we have to add an-
other dimension in order to be able to accept Functionalism as an 
explanatory concept: We must account for: 
a) How and why any institution was set up in the first place, as 
well as  
b) How it was set up to operate, what changes may since have 
occurred and how. 
c)  This paves the way for any subsequent discussion of whether 
the goals of the founding fathers were later displaced and 
how, when and why.  
 
Thus, according to Durkheim, in order to explain a social institution 
we need at least to search in two dimensions: analysis of processes 
and an historical clarification of opus operandi. 
• how  function , a quasi-static exposition of a structure and how it 
functions 
• why  genesis , a quasi-dynamic exposition of the historical process 




the situation when, how and with which arguments the English 
poverty laws were established.37 38  
So, in order to explain, it is necessary, but not sufficient to describe 
how something functions. We also need to know why, as Socrates, 
too, taught.39 
 
Today, organizational design draws heavily on functional princi-
ples. Take, for example, the functionalist recommendations by 
Ernest Hass for the reconstruction of a unified Europe after WW II: 
Cooperation between states is a great challenge, not least due to the 
political interests of the variety of nationally orientated politicians.40 
Thus, his recommendation was to start with integration where it 
should be the easiest: The more functional and less politicised in-
stitutions, such as the national telephone systems, super highways, 
customs etc. Here, the challenges are mainly practical and can there-
fore be left to technicians to solve. In so far as this is a success, the 
inspiration may spread to the politicians and the political elite in 
general, in the form of what is often called a “spill-over effect”. 
Logical Empiricism and John Stuart Mill 
Logical Empiricism is easily ranked as historically the most power-
ful epistemology expounding an explanatory stance. It proclaims 
that “if reality as matter first impregnates our perceptive system 
with ‘data’, then the mind may operate independently of what the 
‘data’ refer to.” Or, in more precise practical terms: First define what 
to observe, how to measure it and collect “data”. Then, by pure logi-
cal analysis, unravel whatever patterns of relations there might be 
between the entities referred to by the data. Then at least the ana-
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lytical part of Science will be independent of man, his whims, emo-
tions and/or political inclinations.  
In short, and this may amount to an implicit definition: The objective-
oriented researcher, looking for the real truth, has to employ a 
double strategy:  
1) A principle of publicly controllable “data” collection – obtained 
by some well-defined measuring instrument open for others to 
use as well. 
2) Analysis by logico-mathematical, including comparative, 
means independent of one’s own mind and open for everyone 
to learn and use. 
The notion of anti-interpretation, expressed as a call for “objectivity” 
can now be sharpened. It is first a negative principle, then a positive 
and a neutral one: 
1.1) Rejection of the notion that some particularly powerful or 
enlightened people should decide what we should all be-
lieve.  
1.2) Instead opt for a more democratic view: We have no reason 
to accept anything as true, which we all cannot be brought to 
see. 
To these, we can now add an implication which has been of par-
ticular relevance for the rejection of case studies: The importance of 
non-involvement: 
1.3) Observation is King. Do not become engaged in or talk with 
the subjects of your study. Let the behaviour of others speak 
for itself in terms of the “data” gathered. 
This attitude is well-pronounced by John Stuart Mill, in his outline 
of the classical experiment:41 Set up two equally composed groups. 
Introduce one – the Experimental Group – to a treatment; to the 
other – the Control Group – do nothing! Then compare the out-
comes. Should we detect any difference between the behavioural 
                                           
 




outcomes of the two groups, we can accordingly – provided the ex-
periment is carefully controlled to exclude all external influences – 
attribute the observed change to the treatment. This seems – at least 
within its own confines – logically neat and tight. And it is. Simply 
“do something and see what happens”, leave it to circumstance to 
decide! 
Thus, the “explanatory approach” leaves no room for anyone who 
wants to be regarded as a researcher to refer to her own sense or 
feeling as an argument for what is going on.42 
To these tenets, we may add two more for further safety: 
•  Formulate as exactly as possible what to identify and how it is to 
be converted into “data”: Construct Validity. 
•  Make sure that a report of what one has done is made open for 
everyone to see, so that others may replicate the experiment and 
a) check the results or b) challenge their robustness under some-
what different circumstances: Reliability. 
The alert reader, however, may have recognized how the power of 
objectivity, as defined above, builds on a simplification: Only facts 
that can be subject to formalized logical operations and thus, are ca-
pable of being processed in a computer, for instance, are allowed. 
Consequently, any form of analysis along lines like those referred to, 
e.g. in Figure TTMEAN, page 6 WP Modes of I, must be discarded 
from research. Statistical analysis describe, they do not explain, but 
of course may lay a foundation for a later interpretation. 
Logical Positivism (School of Vienna) 
Durkheim was a social researcher in his own right. And while his 
works were translated into English, his influence on the philosophy 
of what is right and wrong for social research was, unfortunately, 
not to be as powerful as that of Logical Positivism, which had its roots 
in Vienna. This type of thinking was later to be seen as a caricature 
in that it insisted on or was interpreted as insisting on using only 
                                           
 




physical terms as the basis, not only of Natural Science, but for so-
cial research too – a position given the name Physicalism.43  
Yet, before indulging in criticism, let us first pause for a moment 
and reflect on what the good people in Vienna were up against. 
Take, for instance, the following definition of magnetism by their 
German colleague Hegel: “Magnets exhibit in simple and naive 
fashion the nature of notion and the notion moreover in its de-
veloped form as syllogism. The poles are the sensibly existent ends 
of a real line; but as poles, they have no sensible mechanical reality 
but an ideal one, and are absolutely inseparable.”44 While the second 
statement is not entirely incomprehensible, does it define magnet-
ism as well as the one presented by Aristotle as “having power to 
cause motion” as referred to at page 28 WP Coming to T & T. 
The logical positivists simply wanted to erase such nonsense. Only 
statements expressed in a form that could easily be verified should be 
regarded as scientific.  In short, facts and statements in order to be 
scientific should have: 
o A form that respects correspondence as the primary principle of va-
lidity.  
As we have already shown, this is impossible to achieve given the 
primary function of language. Generally, there is not a 1:1 relation-
ship between language and reality,” see pages 43 ->, WP Coming to 
T & T. 
o Secondly, Science should be built bottom up, with simple, easily 
verifiable sentences – protocol sentences – as the basic “building 
blocks” which are aggregated into greater wholes by logical or 
mathematical means.45 
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o This then lays the foundation for a unified science. Thus, Psy-
chology should build on Biology, which in turn should build on 
Chemistry etc. This is more strictly defined vision of the ideas al-
ready presented by Comte! 
History – constructed as it is from no longer directly verifiable facts, 
sentiment and common-sense judgment – was to be rejected as sim-
ply an arena for anecdotic exercises. And so was Darwinism, build-
ing as it does on “matter of chance”!46 Yet, rejecting “historical time” 
as a dimension in life may suffice for Physics and some other Natu-
ral Sciences, but it does not work for social research, as we have al-
ready referred – not even for explanatory studies, as Durkheim 
taught us! 
 
But let us look at an example of how logic is supposed to serve as 
guidance for real Science: Feyerabend and his wholesale refusal of 
the psychoanalysis of Freud:47 
Say, for example, that I have a dream in which I insert a stick in a 
fork. Obviously, as “Freud” would explain, “I” must have a subcon-
scious desire to have sex with my mother. To this I can either re-
spond: “Oh yes, certainly”, or I can deny it vehemently. In the first 
case, psychoanalysis immediately gets the upper hand. But in the 
latter “Freud” will answer: “Oh, you do deny my proposition. Ap-
parently, you will not even recognize your own inner desires”. 
Thus, my denial is taken as even stronger evidence of what the ex-
pert can see.48 Apparently, there is no room for counter-evidence! By 
accepting both affirmation and denial as confirmation of his own 
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views, the expert will always be right. Thus, Psychoanalysis is laid 
dead in the arena of Science, Feyerabend declares in triumph. 
Yet, the critique by Feyerabend as toreador is just as flawed. It is a 
simplification. Surely “I” may repress internal desires, for instance 
when I do not want to make my vulnerability public. And surely a 
good observer may get an idea of them by observing how I express 
myself. And I may deny everything in public. Yet, this does not 
make it true that I always do so. The problem is simply to find out 
when, how and why – and this calls for dialogue. 
What a dream: A Science devoid of any reference to human values!  
According to the positivist idiom, values may have a place in life, 
but not in Science. One cannot be both objective and emotionally 
devoted to visions of life, religion or nationhood. Thus, Science can-
not be used to tell others what we ought to do. 
Of course one could use a measure like “a good man is one who 
serves others well”. But what we cannot do – while respecting the 
principles of objectivity outlined here – is claim that because some 
people can be characterized as good, then we should all be so. A de-
scription of what is, does not allow us to state what ought to be. 
And should we do so, we would be committing what G.E. Moore 
called the naturalistic fallacy.49 What people believe is good is simply 
what they believe to be so. End of story! And should you miss the 
point, the logic is all the more obvious, if our example had been “a 
bad man is one who exploits others”. Further, what does “serve 
others well” mean? Is not just another word for “being good”? 
“Good” has no definition.50 It is an expression of a belief. 
Science must – out of respect for the ideal of objectivity and in de-
nial of subjectivity – abstain from letting itself be used as a founda-
tion for value judgements. This is indeed a calming assurance for, 
say, a marketing advisor to the tobacco industry! 
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THE BLURRED LINE  
“Do not let yourself be beaten” 
For one, “explanation” is a poly-semical word with a much wider 
range of connotations than we generally ponder upon. Let us look at 
an example: A woman has been brutally beaten up by her husband 
because he saw how her napkin fell to the floor – or as he saw it, she 
dropped it. The beating was well deserved. She must be more care-
ful, he claimed. “I might have taken it to wipe my mouth. I cannot 
do that with a soiled rag.”  
Now, obviously as he sees it, the drop of the napkin triggered his 
rage. But I grant that not many people will accept that as an expla-
nation. In our mind – as we interpret social behaviour – we need to 
search for the prepositions, the string of events that brought the 
poor fellow into a state where even the tiniest of events could re-
lease his rage.  
To achieve an “explanation,” we have to arrive at a historical ac-
count of the underlying circumstances – as emphasised previously 
by the founder of Functionalism, Durkheim. This is not just some 
short-term input-output relation. So even though the language of 
Social Science is rooted in everyday talk, with all its ambiguities, we 
have to coin the terms we share with greater precision.   
Yet, all the time we hear how all sorts of rhetorical tricks parade as 
explanations: “Why are paintings by Edvard Munch stolen time and 
again?” the interviewer asks. “Because they are in such high de-
mand,” the expert answers, thus expressing, see Figure TIMEAN on 
page 6 WP Modes of I, that he does not know, as if to explain is a 
question of relating words to other words, ref pg 77 WP Modes of 
I.51 
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Once in a blue moon 
For a more intricate example, let us look at the term “blue moon” – 
the second appearance of a full moon within the same month. Why 
this name? Oh, we may be told it is a phrase dating back to Shake-
speare: “You will be rich the day the moon turns blue”.52 But by this, 
he means that something is never going to happen. And two full 
moons do happen every 33rd month. No, the phrase “blue moon” 
came to us through a series of misunderstandings.  
In the 1930s, the “Maine Farmers’ Almanac” carried tables of astro-
logical events and, whenever there were four full moons within a 
season, the third was highlighted in blue. Later, in 1946, the author 
of an article in the magazine Sky and Telescope introduced the defini-
tion as referring to the printing practice of the Almanac. In 1980, the 
radio programme StarDate, referring to Sky and Telescope, spread the 
notion even further. Finally, a few years ago, “blue moon” surfaced 
as a question in Trivial Pursuit. The concept intrigued an editor of 
Sky and Telescope, who decided to find out why. By retracing the 
steps, he finally came to their own old editor.53  
A fascinating story and an exception to the rule of the hidden his-
tory of words, see Figure WEST, page 73, WP, Modes of I, and as 
such a good explanation! Right? Well, we will come back to that in 
four pages. 
What a muddle! 
But first let us recall that explanations and interpretations alike are 
attempts to give an answer to a why question. And as Science has 
presently become the prevailing idiom of foremost excellence, the 
ability to explain seems more respectful than interpretation and in-
tuition. Thus, some social researchers are tempted go to great 
lengths to convince us, and in turn themselves, that they explain, 
whereas to others they just seem to be basking in interpretations, 
perhaps due to their political view of the world. Marxism may serve 
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us well here as an example.54Thus, interpretations are often dressed 
up to appear as explanations in a format we later will call expreta-
tion. Therefore, it can at times be hard to see what is what. Take, for 
instance, the expression: “The strongest survive”. This can be: 
o A conclusion based upon a series of investigations grounded in 
field work, where “strong” and “survival” are measured inde-
pendently of each other for several scores of individuals and then 
compared. Strong being defined by strength, eating and mating 
behaviours etc; survival by length of life, number of offspring 
etci55;  
o An interpretation based upon an analogy to Darwinism and 
transferred to, say, a social arena; 
or  
o It may be a tautology, claiming that those who survive must be 
the strongest.  
Thus, we have to look at the context in order to determine whether 
an utterance like “The strongest survive” is an explanatory scheme, 
an ideology or just rhetoric. Yet one is easily deceived, as the last 
two usages often masquerade as being like the first. 
 
Lastly, and no less confusingly, whether I interpret rather than ex-
plain, may not be a question of form at all, but of self-awareness. 
Say that I present a reason for an increased rate of absence in plant B 
at time T, while knowing there could be other causes as well. If so, I 
am – and I do know I am – presenting an interpretation. Preferably 
the one most appropriate for the audience I am addressing. Yet the 
format is still explanatory! 
So without detailed, close-up awareness, we may never know what 
is what. So when I – at a distance – see as someone present as the 
cause of an occurrence, it may, in my mind, just occur as an inter-
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pretation, because I am aware of other potential reasons. As I see it, 
the other has – without further ado – just found an argument that 
makes sense to her. Maybe she just takes a probable cause for the 
only one, committing the fallacy of insufficient specification. Or she 
may, in fact, have explored other possibilities too, even while she 
now ,in her presentation, only focuses on the most important one. 
 
So be aware of how interpretations often share the same form as explana-
tions: When X happens, then, due to a given set of circumstances, Y 
will occur because of a given rule, law, e.g. the dispositions of the 
powerful, the deprived, man’s drive for competence, lust or power.  
Yet there is a profound difference: While the interpreter is looking 
back, trying to make sense of what has happened, the explicator is 
looking ahead, giving us, and especially the decision-makers, rules 
on what action to take and why in order to attain the desired goals.  
Towards rules for the social  
Scientific practices are derived from our daily practices in general. 
So let us once more return to ordinary practice in order to get a bet-
ter grip on “explaining”. Consider the following statement: 
OEDIPUS WENT MAD AS HE FOUND HE HAD MARRIED HIS MOTHER.56 
Assuming that we are already acquainted with the tragedy, the 
statement claims that their marriage explains his subsequent mad-
ness. Or, if you like, the marriage is the cause of his madness. But 
many young men brought up by lonely mothers have been enticed 
to have intercourse with them in their teens without such severe 
consequences. So the opus operandi need to be specified! 
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Events cannot explain events 
But there is more to it. Stating the antecedent condition for an out-
come is not sufficient for explaining. And in this instance no reason 
is even given. So let us rephrase the  above statement as follows:57  
OEDIPUS'S WENT MAD AFTER MARRYING THE WIDOW OF LAIUS.58 
Most of us will discard such a claim as misleading, if not outright 
false. If so, the claim that “Oedipus went mad as he found he had 
married his mother” hardly explains anything. Events simply cannot 
explain events. And even if, in this instance, there could be a rule of 
inference to cover the incident, we need to know whether its range 
of applicability goes beyond the case of Oedipus.59 60 
Thus, while some may have thought that, a few pages back, we ex-
plained how the current meaning of the term “blue moon” origi-
nated; we did not. We told you how it came into being. And it made 
sense to you in so far as you recognized that it could have happened 
like that. If the reader can identify how I relied on any rules in com-
posing the account, fine by me! I am unaware of them. But sure, we 
may be thrilled or even feel enlightened by a good narrative, which 
we then – in ordinary life – attribute explanatory value to. However, 
social research demands far more sharpness. 
 
Now, events cannot explain events. But then you might ask “Is it not 
true, that Kennedy died because Oswald shot him?” No! A lot of 
people are shot at hit and survive. I grant you, as a historical fact 
that Kennedy was shot. But it takes more than just being hit by a 
bullet to die. You have to describe where, how and with what ve-
locity he was hit and by what type of bullet etc. To explain is not just 
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to state a chain of subsequent events. Details do matter, but so do 
the rules by which we infer what happens. 
And while a detailed physical and biological account may clarify 
how Kennedy died, we still would not have explained how and why 
the event occurred as a social fact. Oswald – I assume – must have 
had his reasons for taking aim and firing. So, we need to present an 
account of the background, beliefs, state of mind and aspirations of 
the assassin as well as what he expected to get out of it. 
Explaining is a tough job. It takes more than just surrendering our 
mind to some short-cut reasoning. 
 
Agents act for a reason, but due to an opportunity 
“Explanation” as an act of giving reasons, referring to causes or to an op-
portunity? 
 Let us say we ask someone to tell us why they, or someone else, 
acted in such and such a way: “Why did Pete enter the bakery?” 
And you might once more be given one of several reasons: “Well, he 
just wanted to buy a cake / He was in a hurry and wanted to eat 
something / He rewarded himself for a task well done etc.”! These 
are phrases which hardly attribute Pete with a reason grounded in 
his psychological genesis. We just assume he wanted to enhance his 
well-being. Or an even fouler example: “Why did he get such good 
grades?” “Oh, he must have worked a lot for it.” 
Such after-the-event statements purport to be explanations, but of 
course are not. There are just more or less ready-made phrases. 
 
Attribution of motives, however convincing, is often fallacious in at 
least two further regards. Firstly, it confuses potential propensity to 
act with what releases it, committing a variant of the fallacy of in-
sufficient specification, in the former case taking the incident of a fal-
ling napkin for the cause. 
Each of us nurtures a multitude of desires and personal ambitions 
we would like to satisfy. But we can only do so much at any given 




any act depends on opportunity as much as potential. Thus, in a 
sense, the triggering impetus will always be something coming to us 
from the outside. Agents act for a reason, but due to an opportunity.  
If so, cause is something outside, but due to an inner tension.61  
Thus, anyone might, as she passes a bakery, feel tempted by a cake, 
and if she were not in a hurry, she might enter the shop even if she 
had promised herself to stick to her diet. But what truly releases an 
act in any given situation? Nobody knows – neither the onlookers 
nor the person committing the act. It is not until the very moment 
that “we” buy the cake and start eating it that we know what we 
really want. 
Secondly, according to the realist ethos of subjectivism, “we” must – 
in order to accept an attribution – be able to acknowledge feeling, 
having felt or at least imagining we could be brought to feel a simi-
lar craving, for example be tempted to buy sweets. Thus, the power 
of attribution as an alleged explanatory effort hinges on perceptive-
ness! Which, in itself, is perfectly all right as a Principle of Nearness. 
It just violates a primary Principle of Explanation as defined previ-
ously: Distance. Thus, the attribution of motives generally appears 
as examples of expretation, interpretations masquerading as expla-
nations, ref. pages 39-> WP Modes of I. 
“Explaining” as an interpretation is all the more evident when the 
attribution of motives is presented without any regard for circum-
stance, opportunity etc. as conditioning factors. It just works in so 
far as we can understand the claim and, thus, imagine the implied 
logic as a possibility.  
For Science, though, explanation is about identifying rules for pre-
dicting what might happen, given a certain specific state of affairs. 
So let us now take a first step in that direction. 
 
 
                                           
 




A proverb at hand is worth a thousand words 
Proverbs: Everyday rules to express what one knows 
We will later address the question of whether social laws are possi-
ble, but let me first draw your attention to a type of rule we often 
bring into play as a sense-making device. Say, we are reminded at 
lunch about a retired professor whose work we have not spoken 
about for a long time. Now someone says, “Out of sight out of 
mind”. And the rest of us nod in appreciation. It sums it all up. Then 
someone else – as he recalls how the institute was managed then – 
might, with sarcasm, add “Absence makes the heart grow fonder”. 
This remark is met with even greater smiles of appreciation. 
Proverbs are powerful tools for condensing lived experience into 
short strings of words. In their own neat way, they help us to place 
singular situations in a wider context. And they work so much bet-
ter as there seems to be one for every situation.  
Thus, they may – as illustrated above – not only come in pairs, but 
like interpretative schemes, see Figure INT, page 4, even be 
flagrantly juxtaposed as “History repeats itself” versus “History 
never repeats itself”. 
Whereas pairs like “Trust takes time” versus “Trust has to be earned 
everyday”, see pages 25 WP In Case of C, emphasize different as-
pects of social reality, be it a spectator view versus a more existen-
tialist stance. Others may be made up for the occasion, like when a 
spouse says, “In this house it takes only one cook to spoil the broth.” 
For more examples please see Figure PROV. 
Proverbs are not supposed to be scientific. Yet, in practice they do 






Figure PROV:  
EXAMPLES OF JUXTAPOSED PROVERBS 
 
Do not fix it unless it is broken 
 
Anything worth doing is worth over-
doing 
 
The grass is always greener on the 
other side 
 
A wrong decision made on time is 
better than the perfect made too late 
 
You can have too much of a good 
thing 
 
Prevention is better than 
cure 
 
A good maxim is never out 
of season 
 
There is no place like 
home 
 
Haste makes waste 
 
The more, the merrier 
 
Proverbs serve us well. On any occasion, and thus without any 
reference to circumstance, they aptly sum up experiences in “as-
we-all-know” types of reference! So handy to use as minute-level 
theory statements, because they seem to express a general truth or 
wisdom!62 
 
Maxims are even more advanced “rules” as they include contradic-
tions, be it naivety and reflection in one double stroke, as for exam-
ple these by La Rochefoucauld: “If we had no faults, we would not 
find so much enjoyment in seeing faults in others” or with a refer-
ence to the tensions between qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches to social research: “We try to make virtues out of the faults 
we have no desire to correct.”63 
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Can social laws – should they exist – have the same standing as proverbs? 
Just like proverbs and maxims serve us well as rules for summing 
up human experience, so should social laws, which apparently can 
also come in juxtaposed pairs.  
Some suggest, for example, that workers are only interested in 
earning as much as possible by doing as little as possible, while 
others state that workers first and foremost want an interesting job. 
Of course, both claims may be true for some according to circum-
stances, be it level of living standard, type of job and skills needed, 
degree of ownership and/or personal needs. Likewise, some pro-
ducers claim that what matters is quality, whereas others state that 
consumers just want low prices. And yes, both claims may be true 
according to what product and what type of consumer we are talk-
ing about. 
Thus – as John Elster suggests – it may be worth asking whether 
rules supposedly expressed as theoretical statements within social 
research have any further bearing than proverbs.64 And sure, if the 
opus operandi are not stated, even the most statistically grounded 
rules can hardly be believed to be more trustworthy than proverbs. 
Of course, most of them are not untrue in the sense that evidence 
cannot be found as they are backed by evidence! Yet they may still 
be fictitious in the sense of being incomplete, as illustrated by the 
opening discussion in the book concerning the Blasi theorem, see 
page 4 WP Coming to T & T. 
Of course, contradictory theorems are seldom found within the 
same school of social thought. In the above case, “getting as much as 
possible with the least investment” is a spill-over from a purely eco-
nomic dogma, whereas the “taking interest” theorem is a spill over 
from Humanistic Psychology and its impact on Organizational The-
ory. For a brief review of other such juxtaposed social “truths”, 
please see Figure SOTHE. 
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Figure SOTHE:  
TWO EXAMPLES OF JUXTAPOSED SOCIAL THEOREMS 
 
Revolution is due to ele-




The Maslow Pyramid: the 
drive for self-realization 
does not occur until man’s 
elementary need for shelter 
and food has been met. – 
The case of the interest of an 
enlightened bourgeoisie.  
 
Revolution occurs only when situa-
tions have improved somewhat and 
aroused the hope of people for more. 
 
Existentialism: Man is responsible for 
creating his own life, and is – if 
aroused – prepare to sacrifice his own 
well-being in order to help bring bet-
ter social circumstances around for 
the group he identifies with. – The 
case of monks, freedom fighters or 
political activists.  
 
Like proverbs, theories at any level can often be juxtaposed in pairs. 
Any of the two claims may at times be unverifiable or false. In other 
instances, both claims may be partially true. 
In the cases above, in the first of the two pairs, the second example 
has, at least been partially verified. In the second pair, both ex-
amples need to be verified. So with sufficient specification of opus 
operandi, we would expect the apparent disagreement between 
them to disappear. 
 
There is always more to the social domain than can be said in words, 
though it may be expressed through words 
Paradoxes 
It is fascinating that contradictory social theorems do not arouse the 
debate one should expect. It is as if different schools of thought do 
not even bother to look across the fence! But there is more to it: 
Case workers struggling with mid-level research issues may very 
well identify how several apparently potential contradictory forces 
are active at the same time. Our ability to generalize with due re-
spect for opus operandi is simply too limited to exhaust the poten-
tial sets of what might and is occurring. Or more precisely: Neither 




a general rule for any occasion and thus honour the law of requisite 
variety.65  
If so, we are more or less doomed to submit to the fallacy of insuffi-
cient specification of opus operandi. The paradoxes in Figure PADO 
may illustrate this. 
                                           
 




Figure PADO:  
EXAMPLES OF MANAGERIAL PARADOXES 
 
Paradoxes occur when  
o a claim that seems reasonable enough in itself is brought in line 
with another equally reasonable and verified claim66 
o and the two claims cannot – at least in their current formulation – 
be formally true at the same time 
 
As an example, let me present five of eleven pieces of advice 
adapted from the manual of the Danish company Lego : Managers 
shall:67  
o Lead the way – and stay in the background 
o Show confidence in their subordinates – and supervise 
o Fight for their own unit – and make sure everyone sticks to the 
company objectives 
o Be direct in confrontations with employees – and restrain them-
selves 
o Be self-assured and remain humble 
 
The contradictions inherent in these pairs are due to a mixture of 
reasons: lack of specification both vis-à-vis particular employees 
and with regard to processes, as well as a mix of first and second-
order instructions. But also as stated: “Our language is not rich 





                                           
 
66 For another somewhat similar, though a little more obscure definition, see R.E. 
Quinn & K.S. Cameron (eds): Paradox and Transformation, Balling Publishing Co., 
MA, 1988, page 2 as well as J.D. Ford & R.W. Bakhoff: Organizational Change In 
and Out of Dualities and Paradox, page 89. 
67 Slightly reformulated from Lotte L. Lüscher: Working through Paradox, PhD Thesis 
Aarhus School of Business, #5, 2002, page 22. The former HR Officer at LEGO, Per 





Inquiry theoretically conceived  
never explains why, but limits itself to how something is. 
But when inquiry is directed towards the means for guiding our activity, 
 it takes the contrary cause. 
Auguste Comte68 
Introducing weak and strong explanations 
Interpretations will tend to make a probable cause the cause. Thus, 
the range and applicability of an interpretation has to be uncertain.  
By contrast, explanations have to identify when they should be 
valid. We shall later see whether this is even possible. Yet, the more 
a claim can be perceived as part of a greater corpus of settled beliefs, 
the more likely it is to be accepted at large. But since not all expla-
nations have the same firm foundation, we have to distinguish at 
least between weak and strong: 
•  Weak explanations give us only a rule that enables us to infer 
how something will react to a given impulse under more or less 
specified modus operandi. Weak explanations are rules for ex-
pected reactions to given impacts  
•  Strong explanations also give information on why the given rule 
works. That means outlining the workings “beneath the surface”. 
Thus, we should know how to change our expectations if the 
environment changes.  
•  In short, strong explanations include a historical or even a fu-
turological dimension, whereas the weaker ones are more or less 
static and bound within an often not very well-recognized con-
text.  
Weak explanations can be exemplified by the instructions we give 
children when they are learning how to tell time. Strong explana-
tions, accordingly, could be exemplified by a step-by-step descrip-
tion of how the inner mechanics of the clock make the hands move. 
                                           
 
68 August Comte: The Catechism of Positive Religion, (1852) London 1858, paraphrased 




In the first case, we will hardly know what to do, should the clock 
stop, in the second instance, we will have an idea of how to repair it. 
Strong explanations, therefore, may be used for planning. Engineers 
designing a new airplane will, from the first drafting stage, have to 
rely on strong explanations. The performance of the future plane 
depends on minute attention to the details of and interfaces between 
myriads of internal operating units.  
Thus, behind strong explanations lurks what can be called the engi-
neering ideal, first and most beautifully expressed in the mechanical 
universe of Newtonian mechanics as the bygone ideal for the Natu-
ral Sciences. Yet most natural phenomena are not known to a degree 
or depth to allow us to present images of their inner workings. 
Thus, in the case of the more intricate, like biological phenomena, 
including medical phenomena, we may often have to accept only 
identifying relations, which hitherto seem to appear with a certain 
degree of regularity. As for instance, contaminated water was iden-
tified as a potential cause of typhoid fever long before anybody 
knew why. Any such correlations – or superficially indicated relations, 
as we will call them – act as indicators of where it could be worth 
digging deeper in order to unveil any, for now, hidden realities (see 
statistical generalization on page N89N<-).69 70 
Thus, the Biological Sciences, too, keep the engineering model as the 
ideal, as should any social practice geared towards problem-solving! 
Unfortunately, managerial consultancy often leads to overselling. 
As money is involved, social explanations are all too often made up 
to appear as stronger than they really are. Thus, many alleged ex-
planations function just like interpretations in disguise, explications 
as we will call them, for example as illustrated by the often used 
                                           
 
69 The word “superficial” is a metaphorical reference to what can be observed and at 
best even measured as appearances “on the surface” – be it through observation of 
what occurs, is said, signalled or read as expressions through text, attitudes and 
pictures, or through occurrences of events within organizational life, whether overt 
or unspoken conflicts within a group 




metaphor of motivation, which we could call speculative or mimick-




Figure MOTHY:  
MOTIVATION – A HYDRAULIC METAPHOR FOR ACTION AS DERIVED FROM 
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"used" steam out















Motivation is, as Freud 
saw it, grounded in a 
metaphor borrowed from 
the Mechanics of Fluids. 
Acts are due to the release 
of inner pressure.  
However, the psychology 
of Freud is more sophisti-
cated than Fluid Mechan-
ics. Social man has to cen-
sor himself. And yet ten-
sions we do not allow our-
selves to release will find 
other ways out. Just like 
the rising water behind a 
dam is  
sure to find a new outlet as soon as one potential overflow is 
blocked, like how the Monster Hydra, in Greek Mythology, grew 
new heads as soon as one was cut of.71 
Still, the “internal pressure” metaphor often works well. We do, at 
times, feel an inner emotional pressure or inclination to “release a 
certain behaviour”. However, the metaphor does not in itself allow 
us to infer what – in terms of motivations – may lurk as initiating 
forces even within ourselves. Feelings are aroused within us, but 
whether we follow their drive to make us act depends on how we 
cope with them. Furthermore, feelings in themselves arouse feel-
ings.  
Thus, acting is often premeditated rather than spontaneous, and if 
so the key question becomes “when does what open which gate”. 
So, if we take the metaphor seriously, the control mechanism for the 
opening and release of “steam” is just as important as the pressure 
to act.  
Without inclusion of how we cope, the “drive analogy” for human 
behaviour – however popular – is therefore doomed as a partially 
misleading simplification. 
                                           
 




However, such ad hoc models may serve us well as long as they are 
used with the awareness of being contemporary attempts to go be-
neath the surface, as heuristic guessing games rather than truths. 
Explanatory tactics within social research and their conceptions of man 
Weak explanations are abundant within social research. So, let us 
look at the frames within which such studies may be set, be it in the 
shape of: 
o The simple objectivist approach, the SR (Stimuli Response) model 
o The rational choice model, or rat model, based on the double as-
sumption that what we do relates to the imprint of our past ex-
periences, as well as what we expect our action to lead to, be it 
beneficial or not 
o The more elaborate, yet also more fluffy, agency approach. 
 
According to the simple objectivist approach, man as a subject for 
study is seen as a simple drive-driven object, the behaviour of which is 
defined by need and circumstance, e.g. position in society. According 
to this, any worker is a worker which, like any other sociological 
stereotype, will react accordingly, like a ball hitting another, the it 
model of man. 
The most commonly referred to needs which are supposed to drive 
Western man, in particular, are 1) hunt for pleasure, which can be 
sought in many forms, good food, beautiful surroundings, sexual 
release, social status etc. Thus, 2) if given the choice, “we” would 
avoid unsatisfied cravings, punishment or being subject to bewil-
dering discrepancies etc.  
According to the it model, man can thus be led by threats of be-
reavement as well as expectations of rewards. Or even stronger: The 
model assumes that “man” can be guided or led by promises of re-
wards and inducement of fears – like promises of greater income or 
been fired. This is why this perception of man across types may be 
called the SR model, a given Stimuli will result in a given Response. Ap-




Introducing history, we are led to the next model of man, which is 
both more elaborate and less specific. Man is driven alright, but he 
will not necessarily react in the same way to given stimuli. Imprints 
of our past experiences are accumulated in our bodies. We act on 
what we have come to see as signs of what might be coming. Ac-
cording to this, “we” are expected to evaluate what is going on 
around and within “us”.  
Thus, we learn how to aim for and achieve pleasure and hopefully 
forgo punishment. At least this is the case for all mammals. In deep 
respect for laboratory research on the inborn social inclinations of 
rattus rattus, we will christen this model with a name not neces-
sarily all that flattering for man, the rat model. 
The third explanatory model, the agent approach, brings us closer to 
how self-conscious people perceive themselves, and is, thus, far 
more difficult to work with. The agency model assumes that “we” 
are not just drive-driven, but able to pause before we act and evalu-
ate how to cope with our inclinations. I may, here and now, sense 
how “I” want gratification, but as I recognize this, “I” may never-
theless decide not to indulge as the outcome might counteract some 
long-term goal to which I have committed myself. A model already 
referred to in Figure codes, page 55 WP Coming to T & T.  
In short: An agent is able to both evaluate what he has done and put 
his immediate inclinations to act on hold. He is able to cope with 
what he should do next. Thus, an agent tries to be aware of himself 
both as an it-driven object and a rat-controlling subject at the same 
time. 
Of course, man as an agent can still be led, but agents are seen as 
driven by purposes  
o which we can evaluate and  
o which may not necessarily all be hedonistic,  
o thus we are presumed to be able to forgo many immediate 
inclinations just to act 
Putting trustworthiness aside, rule-making for the expected is an 
easier and simpler conception of man. The it model presumes the 




rules of partial validity according to circumstance. The agency 
model is trickier. Even though there may be rules – and I do expect 
there are – it may be so difficult to specify in sufficient detail when 
to apply these rules (the opus operandi), that it borders the imprac-
tical. This, of course, should be faced as a challenge rather than used 
as an excuse not to apply the rules! 
Rat and agency, first and second-order models of man 
While both rat and agency models thrive on the idea that man can 
be seen as a rule-adapting entity, the latter is obviously more com-
plicated. Or to express in another way, if viewed as machine meta-
phors, man can, in cybernetic terms, be seen either as 
o an It, a plain physical thing-like entity, (no loop) whereas, the 
o Rat approach perceives man as a one-loop72 cybernetic entity, 
while the 
o Agent approach conceives man as a double-loop73 feedback entity 
with the ability to cope with and choose between identified alter-
natives. 
These conceptions are, of course, to be seen only as ideal types. In 
reality, all three models may be relevant, depending on the type of 
arousal and goals. Sure, the it model and the rat model may offend 
our self-images as entities with a “free will”, regardless of whether 
we, in certain ways, do react as need-driven or not. They may even 
be so much more insulting, because we actually do let ourselves re-
act.  
 
                                           
 
72 A simple one-loop machine is like a thermostat geared to use energy in order to 
maintain a specific state (200 C  in our rooms) despite variations of temperature in 
the environment. See Figure XX. 
73 A double-loop machine is also able to use energy in order to maintain a certain state, 
but it is also able to “choose” the most convenient ways of doing so. Or put 
metaphorically, it works strategically, whereas a one-loop machine is just a tactical 




Thus, social researchers face more than one challenge. As the agent 
model may be too demanding to work with, the it model and the rat 
model have a beauty of their own: They can be made subject to sta-
tistical analysis. Whatever implications this may have for those 
studied – as agents – this should not be used as a means of rejecting 
either of the simpler models. It is absolutely recommendable to ex-
plore when and to what degree which people seem to act in foresee-
able ways, as if governed by rules. Systematic empirical research 
may serve us well as a supplement or even a corrective to proverbs! 
Reactions to advertising, consequences of inducement of fear are a 
most relevant study for the it approach, whereas arousal of angst 
and shame can be explored by the rat model. The agency model 
would be needed as an instrument to explore how we may learn or 
not learn to cope with stress, passions and other challenges accord-
ing to the circumstances we encounter or have encountered.  
 
Finally, let us look at the position of researchers. The two simpler 
approaches assume the researcher is able to put herself a) at a dis-
tance from the people she studies and subsequently b) categorise 
their reactions to stimuli in order later c) to predict how they will 
behave according a certain series of impacts. Information she may 
later d) sell to others in order for them to exploit the public; as lan-
guage in itself is given to us as a domain where we can seemingly 
talk about how to handle realities without necessarily stepping out 
into them. This is one of the main reasons why fairytales are told, 
novels read and alternative plans laid open for consideration!74 
This is often expressed as a claim for dualism: As a researcher, “i” 
place myself outside the domain of people I study and just observe. 
A super position! Seeing oneself as  supposedly free, passionless, 
neutral, analyzing entity, while those “I” study are seen as driven by 
a thirst for gratification.  
Within this paradigm, researchers by implication set “themselves” 
above mankind at large. This assumed ability or inclination to ob-
                                           
 




jectify the social domain and reason about it as a detached non-en-
tity can be heralded as the fulfilment of an old aspiration of achiev-
ing spiritual freedom: Placing oneself outside the context of human 
bustle and without giving oneself away to any emotions and 
through disciplined procedures being able to decide what is really 
true.75   
The question is not only whether this is really possible, but whether 
it is the most productive approach to the Other, as we shall see in 
the last chapter on “understanding”. 
Making yourself up as a researcher in the explanatory style 
Explanations are the foundation for success for Natural Science in 
creating our present wealth. 
o Thus, explaining has become a paradigm for several types of so-
cial research too. 
o Thus, we may often, though not necessarily by design but by 
habit, give interpretations a formal dress – mimic our research – 
as if we are working along an explanatory trail.  
o Thus, expretations76 – while being sloppy about opus  operandi – 
often adapt to the same logical format as explanations: Y will 
happen if x is induced. 
However, social research has by necessity a personal dimension. We 
work for others, together with others or subject others as objects to 
our investigations. Thus, social researchers committed to Natural 
Science as an ideal, have to guarantee their readers that “we” pursue 
a practice of non-involvement. So far, the personal is seen not as a 
source of inspiration but as bias; all sorts of rhetorical tricks have to 
be invented to honour this idea This calls for a rhetorical twist of de-
personalization, which is demonstrated in several ways: 
                                           
 
75 See Charles Taylor:: Human Agency and Language, (1981), Cambridge University 
Press, 1985, page 113. 
76 In some of forms C is derived from Y, making a probable cause, the cause, claming 




o Stay aloof, stay out, do not ever show anything but theoretical 
concern, and thus never use “I”! 
o Stick to objectified expressions and numbers, logical and/or 
mathematical expressions! 
o Do your best to convert what could be seen as an interpretative 
endeavour into the format of explanation, i.e. cause-effect se-
quences. 
Or worst of all: 
o Assume you are working with universal laws for human be-
haviour, thus avoiding the calamities of having to pay too much 
heed to either agency or opus operandi. 
Self-conscious, explanatory researchers thus never have to say, “It is 
my experience that...” or “I believe that...” Instead, one has to speak 
with alleged empirical authority, e.g. “‘data’ have already shown 
that..”. Nor write: “I searched through the library for a theory that 
could throw some light on my facts!” Instead, write something like: 
“According to the already well-proven theory, TT, we know that ...” 
For further and more detailed illustrations, see Figure EXTRI.77 
 
                                           
 




Figure EXTRI:  
IN THE GAME OF EXPLAINING, YOU NEED 
TO DE-PERSONALIZE WHAT YOU STATE 
 
In order to impress the reader with your aptitude for explanation, 
present results in a format that shows how well they mirror the 
world, as if text – without any distortion or personal involvement – 
is in a 1:1 (isomorphic) relationship with the subject matter. 78 
 






An experiment, set up by A in spring 1956, at 
his father’s plant, located in an isolated area on 
the outskirts of Middleville in Eastern Canada, 
indicated that possibly ... 
 
It has already 
been demon-
strated (referen-
tial footnote) that 
.... 
 
As I pressed the button, I observed – to my 
surprise – how “R” quickly changed its be-
haviour from ... to ... and then remained in this 
new state. How could that be? I had to search 
the Internet in order to get a feel and perhaps 
even find words for what I was dealing with 
and finally found an answer 
As predicted by 
theory T, when 
induced by a 
stimulus of 3 
Amp at 12 Volt, A 
in 5 seconds will 
change from ... to 
… 
 
After having explained my interest in team-
work, the manager for the maintenance group 
at plant N1 introduced me to some of his 
workers. Ten days later, the week before 
Christmas, I led the group into the first of my 
experiments. This caused some turmoil. Not 
everyone was really interested! Nor did they 
react in the same way. I was bewildered!  




how people react 
differently when 
induced to a 
treatment T, de-
pending on their 
family back-
ground. The fol-
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time at plant N2. Again people acted dif-
ferently. Yet I knew some of the participants 
personally, thus I had a hunch. Perhaps family 
background mattered? Thus, I wondered 
whether having grown up with a self-em-
ployed father or mother could be of vital im-
portance for technical activism. It was! And 
this may even be so much more significant for 




ism is related to 
having been 





In short: If you want to be taken seriously, do not show your hand, 
or that it shakes. ” Stay aloof, be cool, you are not a person, you are 
an impassionate, detached expert doing research!” 
 
Within the scheme already outlined for meaning, you might say that 
the explanation ethos requires you to 
o Simplify the information and stick exclusively to the subject un-
der investigation. 
o Never ever express your personal anxieties, joys or concerns. 
o Restrict your rhetorical efforts to effective neutral expressions. 
If, as a result, your report becomes boring, like for example the 
statements listed in Figure EXX, don’t worry. It is meant to be. Social 
research in the explanatory idiom is not meant to amuse or please. 
What counts is to appear correct. 
 
There is only one problem with explanation.  
One can hardly explain what it is, only demonstrate it. 
Cause – A white dove or...? 
Looking through textbooks, the call for objectivity in social research 
is generally supplemented with the notion that an explanation 1) 
consists, at least, in identifying causes as well as, even better, 2) de-
ducing what must be expected to happen according to a set of al-
ready established theories, as indicated by Figure 4.1, WP Coming 
to T & T, page 29 and the left side of Figure 6, page 32, same WP. 




least two reasons – particularly if the advocacy for explanation 
should be a way to outdo interpretation: 
  
 “Man, the measure of all things ...”79 
Protagoras 490-421 BC 
Cause – Primarily a concept not of Science, but of Jurisprudence 
If causes do exist, they are at least not observable, as Hume right-
fully taught.80 Causes are something inferred. Yet, some claim that 
the red billiard ball causes the white to move as it hits it. This is 
nothing but a figure a speech – as we shall see – adapted from our 
fondness for attributing motives to “the girl next door” as an act of 
sense-making.  
Sure, the nail is driven into the plank as my hammer hits it. But it is 
not the hammer that drives the nail. Nor is it – as I have heard some 
say – gravity that makes apples fall. No, apples fall according to 
Newton’s second law of movement and the local rate of gravity the 
moment the stem breaks. Likewise, the white billiard ball is set in 
motion, not because it is hit, but when it is hit. At the moment of im-
pact, the “movement of energy” is transferred from one ball to the 
other. Yet, this is not generally the case for all objects, ball-shaped or 
not. For example, balls of cloth do not behave that way. What hap-
pens depends on a) the angle of impact, b) the hardness of the balls, 
c) the surface underneath etc.  
The fact that “heavy objects fall” is a regularity, a most trustworthy 
rule on which to rely. Yet, there is a catch: Should an object not fall 
as I release it, it cannot be a heavy, but must be a light object! The 
very notion “to be heavy” means to fall, if released. Thus, nothing is 
explained. The statement just demonstrates the proper use of a cer-
                                           
 
79 Twisted reference to Plato: Theaetetus, 152 B, (390 BC), Loeb Library, 1952.  
80  David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1740), part iii, section xiv, part 




tain string of words, as Saussure taught language works, refer to 
WP Modes of I, page 73  
Natural Science needs rules for what to expect, not causes. Causes 
belong to the social realm, not the natural. Modern Science is not apt 
at bestowing powers on dead matter, but at searching for rules that 
may guide us to, say, a better living. “Cause” is an agency term and, 
in particular, a Jurisprudence term along such lines as: “Who caused 
this foul deed to happen? Find the culprit!”  
Identification of causes is simply a linguistic mechanism transferred 
from the human to the material world, a metaphor, as if entities 
within “the realm of its” – i.e. things – may do something by them-
selves when set in motion. This is not how scientists perceive their 
world: “A physical law is a relationship between measurements that 
comes out the same every time”.81 
Thus, we have once more to return to the Procrustes bed82 for ex-
plaining: Explanations have to enable us to foresee what will hap-
pen when Y is exposed to x at time T, under a given set of opus op-
erandi, OP. Not just as interpretations to make sense of what did 
happen. Yet, even the ability to forecast, while a necessary condi-
tion, is not a sufficient condition for strong explanations, as we shall 
see next: 
                                           
 
81 Robert B. Laughlin: A different Universe, Basic Books, 2005, page 30. 
82 Procustes, a son of the God for Earthquakes and the Sea, seized and fastened people 
to a bed. It they didn’t they fit, he either cut of their limbs or stretched them until they 




Laws at higher level derive 
from the laws of lower-level building blocks. 
Holland 83 
Moving from weak towards stronger explanations 
Ability to forecast – A necessary, yet not a sufficient, condition for 
explaining 
For thousands of years, the old Babylonians kept records of celestial 
events and were thus able to forecast the eclipses of the sun without 
having the faintest clue of how this repetitive behaviour was 
possible. Likewise, we may successfully forecast rain by taking 
omens from the flight of swallows, without being able to elucidate 
whether they or something else has an impact on the weather to be, 
ref page 68N<-.  
Explaining in the weak sense is to give a rule for what to expect 
now. In the stronger sense we also have to know why.  
Explaining as a multi-layered activity 
Explanations in ordinary life, though, are often synonymous with 
given reasons. Also, they may come in many forms, ranging from 
apparent, more narrow and local to highly integrated theories in the 
form of claims, from statements like: 
o He did what his nature disposes him to do. 
o This is what usually happens! 
o The profile of an aeroplane wing is designed in such a way that 
the air stream above the wings is led to pass through a longer 
distance than the stream below. This creates a vacuum above the 
wing that sucks the plane upwards as it moves forwards. 
The first statement purports to explain, but is in fact tautological. 
The second states a rule with the power of proverbs. Only the third 
sets us on the track towards a proper explanation as it refers to 
                                           
 
83 John H. Holland: Hidden Order – How adaptation Builds Complexity, Reading, MA, 




theories that enable us, from a set of already established theorems, 
to deduce a constructive rule. Yet, people who know nothing about 
fluid mechanics may find it hard to accept that aeroplanes are 
sucked up in the air. If so, they will see my explanation as an 
interpretation.  
However, wing designers rely on the rules from which they deduce 
how to create any wing with a given set of specifications for 
performance. They think forward, ready to have their derived 
suggestions exposed to reality tests. In short, the engineering 
approach is the epitome of strong explanatory power. 
Strong explanations show us 1) how liquids, artefacts and persons 
behave under specified exposures as well as 2) what is at work “be-
low the surface”. They tell us why. Whether we should believe any 
such modelling of the real depends on whether the claimant is able, 
3) through constructive thinking, not just to deduce what we must 
expect will happen in any upcoming circumstance, but 4) is also able 
to create the means to make it happen.84 
But there is even more to it, as the theories applied on a low level 
are derived from upper-level generalized theories. 
Thus, strong explanations are able to show how performance on an 
upper level is a result of a lower-level activity, in this case the flow 
of air streams around the wing. The constructive approach explains 
performance on the phenomenological level by applying high-level 
theories to a level beneath the phenomenological, as illustrated in 
Figure CONAPP. 
 
                                           
 
84 Constructors though do not work just by following rules. Constructions is as much a 
learning by doing process of constantly searching for ways and means for adapting 
and combining rules as well as assigning the right values, ref Idel Harel & Seymour 




Figure CONAPP:  
FROM MERE DEDUCTION TOWARDS  
THE STRONGER IDEAL OF CONSTRUCTION 
 




































Through repeated experiments, induction and theoretical modelling, we may 
create upper-level theories, (see page XX). This provides a base from which we 
can deduce the rules to apply in concrete, well-specified situations we may en-
counter in future. 
Weak deductions will, at best, merely be grounded in temporary statistical 
evidence for the occurrence of events. A two-level way of thinking: from the 
phenomological level to rule and back. Thus deductions from an upper level 
and one down will show “only” how something works, not why! 
Constructive thinking has to work across at least three levels. From an upper 
level, at first bypassing the phenomenological level, identifying the processes 
“beneath” it in order to forecast the phenomenological. Or, as one might say, 
constructive thinking is based on knowledge of what makes events happen 
and why. Strong explanations are based on what is sufficient to know to make 
events happen. 
An example: A strong explanatory approach to the stock market rather than 
sheer statistical analysis would, amongst other real-time factors, integrate:  
1)  Build-up of and draws from inventories of produced goods  
2)  Present demand for raw materials 
3)  Emerging patterns of production and trade 
4)  Current political developments around the world and, especially,  





The challenge of multi-theoretical approaches to social research 
To span across several levels is often a greater challenge than most 
students of social research are able, or at least inclined, to take on. 
Many students seem just all too thrilled to finally hit on a “nice” 
theory and apply it either a) in an interpretive effort of making sense 
out of already given evidence at hand or b) as a guide for fieldwork.  
In the first case, the theory with all the prestige associated with its 
creator is accepted in advance as a given fact. So, what will be no-
ticed as the facts to generate is given as the “data” for which the 
theory calls. And thus the conclusion to aim for, too. Such a deduc-
tive approach and use of an already given theory as the axiomatic 
base is generally seen as permissible. And even the opus operandi 
may initially not concern the researcher acting on faith; the incon-
sistencies between what he or she may find and the extrapolation of 
the theory may, at best, wake her and, at best, guide her to resort to 
analytical generalization to set things in order, ref pages 19 WP In 
Case of C. Such a wake-up call is, of course, more likely to happen 
for case researchers than to mere sense-makers.  
However, for as long as most social theories are based simply on ob-
servations and facts tied together by co-variant analysis, the situa-
tion is not likely to change. A sharp contrast to Science! Nobel prizes 
are given only to those who have been able to detect the processes at 
work beneath relations, which until then may have just been indi-
cated statistically. 
Unfortunately, there are not many cases in which, say, overall com-
pany performance is presented as an outcome of minute private as 
well as inter-personal activities. And even if such cases do exist, as 
for example The Employee Owner85, I am more than willing to admit it 
lacks rigor. 
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Differentiating characteristics between  
expretations, weak and strong explanations 
We have already demonstrated how explanation and interpretation 
are all too often muddled up. The sheer desire to erase the spirit of 
interpretation is no guarantee of overcoming it. Quite the contrary, 
as we shall illustrate in the upcoming chapters, beginning on page 
55. However, first I would like to do a more formal exercise. Those 
who may be bored by this should skip the next five pages and go 
directly to the illustrations chapter. 
As stated more than once, interpreters strive to be useful in terms of 
making sense and creating smaller or greater wholes of meaning out 
of what has or is happening. Explanations aim higher as they should 
furnish us with the rules in order to predict or even change what 
could happen, be it by curing the physically unfit, by creating better 
workplaces, movies and/or cities etc. So, let us see whether we can 
identify some further differentiating characteristics. 
 
First of all, interpretations are often all too loose with regard to opus 
operandi, whereas explanations include at least a three-step scheme: 
•  A set of inference rules or – as they are sometimes called – cause-
and-effect schemes for prescribing what new state of affairs to 
expect next. 
•  A set of rules for identifying when and how to apply the inference 
rules chosen, given whatever the initial state (opus operandi). 
•  Furthermore, explicatory inference rules often have a backlog of 
proven applicability. Explanations are to be used as a means for 
reaching desired ends. 
•  Consequently, the goal we have chosen to aim at has to be in-
cluded in the initial state of affairs. 
This should be sufficient to make the first outline of a more precise 





PURPOSE OF APPROACH: 
Whereas 
o Explanations are used as rules of inference, 
o Interpretations are geared to giving meaning by converting 
experiences, be they in the form of observations, arousals or other 
types of outcomes, into text, including speech, in order to make 
sense to the author. 
Thus, contrary to the belief of hardcore adherents of explanations, 
interpretations – if not totally fictitious – may be evidence-based, 
too. 
 
ORIENTATION IN TIME: 
Whereas  
o Interpretations are primarily backward-looking, making sense of 
what has happened by appealing to quotes, proverb-like state-
ments, ad-hoc principles or even strong theories, 
o Explanations are forward-looking, concerned with what may hap-
pen or constructively with making it happen. 
 
CONCERN FOR OPUS OPERANDI: 
o The operating interpretations of social researchers usually take 
the past as a given fact, as indeed it is. Thus, interpreters tend not 
to care too much about stating opus operandi, leaving most of the 
circumstantial evidence unaccounted for.  
o Explanations have to strive for accuracy in terms of describing 
when, where and how we can expect an intervention x to lead to a 
desired outcome Y. Thus, opus operandi has to be stated to the 
best of one’s abilities. 
 
CONCERN FOR DOCUMENTATION: 
o Simply stating a necessary reason is often enough for the inter-




o Explanations have to build upon an established foundation for 
forecasting. Strong explanations, in particular, also call for an 
outline of the sufficient reasons for making something happen. 
 
RELIABILITY: 
Future events may, of course, challenge the adequacy of interpreta-
tions and explanations alike: 
Whereas 
o Interpretations only have to satisfy to be acceptable , 
o Explanations are to be used as a means of realizing certain ends. 
They are much more likely to be tested for verification than inter-
pretations. Thus, the prevalence of theory test designs for evalu-
ating, say, proposed schemes for improved auditing, education, 
flirting etc. 
  
From depicting how to explain why: 
o Weak explanations are rules for the observable related to induc-
tion from the same level to which it is later applied – the how ap-
proach. 
o Strong explanations are concerned with how events do happen or 
even may be made to happen, due to an underlying reality or 
construction of ours – the why approach. 
 
THE CALL FOR FULL EXPLANATIONS: 
Constructive thinking generally builds on a combination of several 
theories across domains. It takes more than knowledge of fluid 
mechanics to construct an aeroplane. Similarly, the case researcher 
must master several disciplines, including economics, production 
planning, accounting, marketing, social and individual psychology 
etc. 






Figure DISAWS:  
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN ALLEGED,  
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Figure SPEC:  
EXPLANATORY RULES AND, THUS, THEORIES MIGHT BE MORE OR LESS 
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The narrower the span and the 
more localized a claim, the easier 
it might be to specify the terms 
under which the research was 
conducted, as exemplified by 
laboratory experiments. 
 
Comparative analysis based on 
grounded research and analytical 
generalization across sets of 
grounded studies lead to mid-
range theories. Case researchers 
may be so sensitive to circum-
stance that they may make no 
claim for correspondence beyond 
their study, while others do feel 
obliged to venture some specula-
tions on the transferability of 
their results beyond the explored 
set of cases. 
 
Proverbs might be taken as the 
ideal type for ad-hoc and un-
specified explanatory rules: An 





ILLUSTRATIONS – WEAK EXPLANATORY 
APPROACHES 
Behaviourism and experiments  
The explanatory approach as well as the attempt within social re-
search to reject interpretation and believe one is committing oneself 
to the idiom of Natural Science is no more pronounced than by the 
ideology of Behaviourism and the controlled experiment: 
Behaviourism 
Behaviourism became the foremost brainchild and practical illustra-
tion of Logical Positivism within Social Science. The idiom of Be-
haviourism consists of a negative and indeed forceful rejection of 
interpretation as well as a positive claim. First, the negative: 
o People are unreliable as informers about their own inner states 
and thus even less able to evaluate others. The attitudes they 
claim to nurture do not match their actions. So skip interpreta-
tions and personal reports, they are too unreliable for research.  
Instead “we” should  
o View behaviour in terms of chains of stimulations and responses 
and, thus, 
o Stick to what is tangible: observational facts. Set up experiments. 
Expose people to a measurable impact and measure only how 
they react.   
Or, as the founder of Behaviourism, Watson, triumphantly claimed: 
“As newcomers to the field, we either “had to give up psychology 
(as an interpretative enterprise) or make it into a Natural Science” … 
Thus, we have to “sweep aside all medieval conceptions… all sub-
jective terms, like perception, image, desire, purpose and even 
thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined.”86 
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Psychological research should be executed along the lines of, say, a 
chemical experiment: state the initial condition of an organism; ex-
pose it to a stimulus, S; observe the resulting state, R. Example: Ex-
pose the palm of a relaxed person to an electrical impact, S, and ob-
serve, R, how fast his hand is withdrawn.87 This, in itself, may be 
excellent within a proper setting. The challenge is whether and how 
you interpret what happens: 
Observation seems to be neutral. And Watson, for one, believes 
himself to master the art of being a non-judgemental observant. To 
enlighten the reader on how this may be achieved, he furnishes us 
with the following account of a girl aged about one year:  
“The infant is sitting up in her bathtub and in reaching for the soap 
accidentally touched the external openings of her vagina with her 
finger. The search for the soap stopped, stroking of the vagina began 
and a smile overspread the face”.88  89 
The example allegedly appears as an objective, bias-free report of a 
child’s doings and her reactions. Yet, no one is necessarily “objec-
tive” just by declamation. In fact, a lot of interpretation is read into 
the observation. The child is seen reaching out for the soap. That is 
an interpretation of intent! Furthermore, the stroking of the vagina 
is seen as accidental. Without having a minute account of the child’s 
prehistory, how can we know whether the actual move is acciden-
tal? Could she not have fondled herself before?  
The example shows purely and simply how difficult it is, if not im-
possible, to describe behaviour without attributing motives to our 
doings.  
Certainly, Behaviourism had its virtues too, and it did certainly lead 
to a lot of social insights. Initial experiments with animals show how 
behaviour may be conditioned by outer stimuli, pleasant or painful. 
Thus, Behaviourism, at least at times, showed respect for the essen-
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tial dimension of the social: That present behaviour is affected by 
the framework set by previous stimuli, – the trail of history.  
Man is shaped by environment and can thus be led. “Give me a 
dozen healthy infants and my own specified world to bring them up 
in. And I’ll guarantee to take any at random and train him to be-
come any specialist I might select, doctor, lawyer, artist, …  thief 
….” as Watson boasts90. 
However, Behaviourism soon acquired a bad name within social re-
search. One may very well question the usefulness of the SR model. 
Yet, it may be worth recalling that Behaviourism did enlighten our 
grasp for learning in general and organizational training in particu-
lar: Do not punish people for doing what you do not want them to 
do. Threats only lead to people trying to avoid being caught. It is far 
better to reward them for reaching out towards the goals you want 
them to pursue.  
Yet, the basic simplistic programme of Behaviourism makes it an 
enemy of itself. Certainly, as referred to above “we” may pay lip-
service to ideals by which we do not live.  However, that does not 
mean, that it is not worth to listen to people. Quite the opposite! It is 
fascinating that what we say about ourselves does not necessarily 
match what we do. So we better not limit ourselves to observation 
as the only fact-generating strategy. If we listen well, we may even 
learn how to create situations in which people will be more willing 
to look at themselves with greater honesty. This is exemplified by 
the best reflective case studies, including those conducted in explor-
ative-integrative mood.91 
By virtue of its initial declamatory refusal to go beneath the skin and 
get in touch with people emotionally, Behaviourism excluded itself 
from reaching out towards stronger explanations, instead sticking to 
the observable. This was to change after WWII by the advent of Cy-
bernetics, but that is another story. 
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Experiments – For better or worse? 
Behaviouristic research designs generally follow the outline of the 
classical92 laboratory experiment, in order to neutralize potential im-
pacts from the environment. To test the effect of, say, a problem-
solving scheme, two groups of “similar” people unknown to each 
other are selected at random and isolated. One group is taught the 
scheme, the other not. Then both groups are asked to solve a similar 
task, and the outcome is measured. As both groups are supposed to 
be similar in all regards, except for the fact that one group was 
taught a skill, the researchers would have good reason to attribute 
acknowledged differences in performance to the treatment. Yet in 
terms of validity, such experiments are subject to a serious problem: 
•  Ecological validity, the question of whether inferences drawn 
from an experimental situation may be applicable to life outside 
the laboratory; in this case groups solving problems more often 
than not involves people who have worked together for several 
years.93 Thus, opus operandi is at stake for any outcome of a 
classical social experiment. 
However, the classical experiment has a simple beauty of its own. 
Thus, even if case studies are the method to choose when the 
environment is an integrated part of the reality studied, the classical 
experiment may still inspire case researchers who set out to explore 
what makes organizations change and how. It is thus recommended 
that case researchers should i) take note of performance before and 
after the occurrence of an event expected to cause change, or ii) 
compare the performance within one company which has been 
subject to an intervention, for example having become employee-
owned, with otherwise similar companies which have not. 
Given the effects of the market and the impact of new technologies, 
it is always uncertain whether any factor, such as employee owner-
ship, can in itself explain differences in performance. Yet, provided 
the links between events leading to the change can be documented 
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and confirmed by the participants, the case study is much more il-
lustrative of what can really happen than any ex-periment carried 
out in the artificial environment of a laboratory. Furthermore, par-
ticipants in the field may even help the researcher identify dimen-
sions and links between events that he may not have envisioned. 
Thus, we are back to the question of the challenge of bias, in this 
case our potential lack of feel for dimensions, of which “we” may 
only become aware through fieldwork. 
Surveys and statistical analysis 
Another classical call for “objectivity” as seemingly non-involve-
ment is to use statistical surveys. Fine if you want to relate the num-
ber and sizes of combines to acreage. But for social research in 
general, and for explanatory studies in particular, statistical analysis 
poses a great challenge. Let us suppose that the behaviour of a 
group of persons or institutions, BY according to circumstance CT is 
believed to be presentable as the outcome of a state of affairs pre-
sentable by a string of variables Xn, thus: 
BY = F( X1,.......Xn,,, CT) + ε, where the Xs may account for  age, sex, 
breed, educational background, alleged behavioural traits etc., while 
ε is the factor of uncertainty already referred to.  
Now statistical analysis may show the weight, α, β, χ ..  ω,  with 
which the different variables – as measured – contribute to a given 
performance. Say whether and how the size of the “offspring” may 
relate to the diameter of the “mother pea” and the conditions of 
growth, as was the initial experiment that led to the invention of re-
gression analysis.94 Or closer to home, how “good management” is 
related to an observed set of defined psychological traits in 
managers. If so, the function F, above, can be expressed in the linear 
formula as below, either directly or in a converted form: 
 BY  =  αX1 + β X2 + .... γ Xn + ε, where ε is the uncertainty variable 
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This is, in itself, certainly nice to know. But please note how such a 
string explains nothing, just like the sentence “Oedipus went mad 
...” did not, see page 24. The analysis – and let us certainly express 
our respect for that – shows us only the weight with which the 
variables under the circumstances which we have taken into account 
contributed to an outcome. The analysis does not delineate why. 
Likewise, experiments with rats may show us how fast different rats 
“learn” to find their way through a maze to the food basket. And we 
may very well pick the best out and breed them, as well as breeding 
some of the best of either sex and the most clumsy and then testing 
the different groups of offspring. The outcome may very well show 
that “intelligence” is inherited from the “mother”. But still, such an 
analysis cannot tell us anything about why it is so, even if it is. 
However, it may indicate the level of certainty with which we can 
substantiate such a claim, which certainly may be of some further 
value if we allow ourselves to transfer the outcome to other mam-
mals, including humans! 
 
But the worst and most tragic aspect of the prevailing dominance of 
statistical analysis within the social domain is the fact that entities – 
supposedly organized as first and second-order systems – cannot be 
depicted, and even less so identified, by linear models: 
Say that the temperature, T, in room, R, apparently remains constant 
over time, T0-TT just as some people, PN, may seem to “always act 
alike” “BD”. Any such conclusion of partial “universality” would, 
even if it may be true in some sense, nevertheless belie a potentially 
far more interesting fact: that we may be dealing with a first-order 
cybernetic system: Yes, the temperature is constant. Not because it is 
just so, but because a thermostat is set to maintain a desired level of 
indoor comfort. Thus, it opens the valve to let in hot water when the 
room starts to cool down.  
Likewise: A person who never seems to be engulfed by aggressive-
ness may, in fact, not be calm by inclination, but just the opposite. 
He may, of necessity, learned to cope with his inner state in the face 




Thus, if any such behaviour is subjected to statistical analysis, the 
resulting conclusion will be a betrayal of reality, which in fact it so 
often is, in so far as we rely solely on superficial observation. 
Taking a more formal look at the controlled experiment 
Finally, let us take a more formal look at the classical or controlled 
experiment: 
Say behaviour, B, of person, R, is seen as a consequence of an inter-
vention or treatment, Tr, the characteristics of the person, P(Xn), 
prevailing sociological Circumstances ,CT, and that B can be calcu-
lated according to a formula, F:  
 R P(BTr) = F( Tr, P( αX1 + β X2 + .... γ Xn ), given CT) + ε0, where ε is 
an un-certainty variable 
When making a controlled experiment in the lab, CT will be fixed as 
C, while P may vary across the sample of subjects involved. Thus – 
as life outside the lab is sheltered off – we are likely to assume 
 R(BTr ) = F( Tr, P ) + ε1 
Yet, under the assumption of universality of man, the formula may 
be reduced to 
 R(BTr ) = F( Tr ) + ε2 
For every one of these steps of simplification, ε, must be expected to 
increase thus ε2 > ε1 > ε0.  
 
But now suppose we are dealing with agents. If so, R( BT ) will not 
just be the result of the treatment, but of Tr given the state, BT-ΔT, the 
organism was in before the treatment. Any foreshortening of cir-
cumstance is bound to lead to correlations that, at best, may only 
stick for a while. Indeed, the essential characteristic of a weak ex-
planation! Thus, it is worth recalling that a driving virtue of Be-
haviourism is to illustrate what a trajectory of past experiences may 
mean to living entities.  
This weakness of statistical analysis is all too often – as illustrated 
above – bypassed by an implicit assumption of universality, that be-




scale, like, say, the weight of objects. This may be the case in some 
incidents, and if not, it is at least the raison d’être for most so-called 
intelligence tests. Yet whether this holds true or not is debatable, not 
least considering that the earliest test set-ups by command from the 
US congress had to be revised in order to equalize the averages for 
men and women. The first test consisted mainly of logico-mathe-
matical tasks, where women in general were as good as men, which 
was perceived as undemocratic.95 
The assumption of universality is a clear violation of the positivist 
idiom for social research as outlined by Durkheim with his empha-
sis on how we need to be aware of historical conditions. Any signifi-
cant outcome of a controlled experiment must thus be seen as a 
pointer, a first sign of what may be worth taking a closer look at. 
And even more to see if it holds true regardless of, say, different 
cultural backgrounds.96 
Thus, we may – as social researchers – treat “the uncertainty factor” 
less lightly. It could at times very well “be en an excuse for second-
rate experimentation and a potential source of false claims”.97 
In what sense can statistical “data” be said to refer to a reality, if opus 
operandi is ignored? 
Statisticians realize that circumstantial contingencies matter. Yet, by 
appealing to the “law of the great numbers”, they make a statistical 
virtue out of ignoring it. If you take a lot of cases into account, the 
array of possible more personal contingencies should neutralize 
each other and just pop up as deviations around a mean. But if opus 
operandi remains uncovered, we are left with the disturbing fact 
that statistical outcomes cannot be applied to concrete cases. 
The use of statistics with its deliberate – if not outright ideological – 
“will to ignore” opus operandi is amazing as it undermines our pos-
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sibility of forecasting the outcome of any concrete incident. The 
central criteria for explanation! 
Please recall the great Durkheim’s notion of “social fact”: At any 
given time “the statistically identified suicide rate” exemplifies a so-
cial fact, not the circumstances that make people kill themselves.98 In 
this way, “fact” becomes a chimera, something claimed to be gen-
erally true for a time. Yet, a closer look reveals that the claim for 
generality is constructed on a base devoid of concreteness. Thus, the 
Durkheimian idea that the causes of social facts are always to be 
found in preceding causes becomes obscure.99 
Statistical “data” do exist, but only by proxy, as does any other form 
of aggregated measurement. 
Confidence of output has to build on estimates of accuracy of input 
Some social researchers like to define themselves by claiming that 
they use the same methodologies and statistical approaches as the 
Natural Sciences. Yet, reliance on statistics is, as already pointed out, 
not at all an idiom for Science, and particularly not for Physics or 
Chemistry. Yet there is at least one area of Science where statistics is 
heavily used: 
•  As an instrument for establishing the trustworthiness of 
measurements is of prime importance for engineering, among 
other disciplines. 
As the Engineering Sciences are geared towards making things 
happen, the trustworthiness of rules is essential. This means that no 
measurement is to be given without an indication of how reliable it 
is. Thus, statistics is used not as an output but as an input for evalu-
ating the measuring instrument, and thus the degree to which the 
entered data can be trusted.  
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For Social Science, it is a curious fact that not even economic scien-
tists try to establish the accuracy of the “data” on which they rely. 
Let us recall how Tycho Brahe made several measurements for each 
sighting of a planet and thus “forced” Kepler to opt for ellipsoid 
planet orbits rather than circular, which for ideological reasons he 
would have preferred. Without concern for the accuracy of input, 
we are of course prevented from evaluating the trustworthiness of 
statistical results, too.  
As with any other kind of research based upon measurements, 
statisticians ought to establish confidence measurements of their in-
put “data”, just like criticism of sources is an essential base for 
History. And if they do not, we should wonder why. 
Statistical studies – A short cut.  
When you know you do not know, but want to test a notion 
Certain statistical surveys may be used to test ideas as a way of 
“fighting bias” by letting the numbers speak. They may give 
“reality” a “word” – a chance to make us aware of how insufficient 
our grasp of it might be. This may subsequently put us on the trail 
of case studies in order to identify the potential dimensions we have 
neglected to include. 
Yet we have to remember always that any correlation of “data” is 
nothing but a correlation. It shows us an outcome; it cannot explain 
anything. Any co-variance between clusters of “data” thus has to be 
interpreted in order for sense to be made of it. Numbers alone can-





THE MOVE TOWARDS STRONGER EXPLANATIONS 
From linear to more complex rules 
I am sure you, my dear reader, will look with sympathy at an ap-
proach for moving from i) weak and, in particular, linear “explana-
tions” – or as we should say temporarily identified relations – to ii) 
explanatory systems, which attempt to link what we measure with 
the genesis of the phenomena studied in order to foresee its poten-
tial futures. However, I am also sure that you may easily be over-
whelmed and feel an ache in your stomach at the thought of the 
sheer magnitude of such a task. 
Thus, it is a challenge that is seldom met, if at all possible. But it is a 
challenge which social researchers – with a regard for relevance – 
have to strive towards fulfilling. If not, how can we give sound ad-
vice to members of organisations as well as politicians? 
Towards stronger explanations – The challenge to be confronted 
As the social domain is conditioned by the historical, we must, in 
line with Durkheim, see both the present and the potential future as 
extensions of the past. This will include awareness, not just of 
change in terms of growth and decay, but of structural change.  One 
may doubt whether this is possible at all. Even if we may in time 
identify a potential for change, as well as the factors that might initi-
ate such change, the outcome of, say, a revolution or even a strategic 
business plan are indeed difficult to foresee. Nor may we know 
whether those who initiate a change are driven by publicly ex-
pressed goals or hidden agendas. 
Cybernetics and General Systems Theory 
As already stated, Behaviourists were not ready to let themselves be 
fooled by the reasons people might present as their intended goals, 
like those committed to laddering are. How very sensible of them! 
At best, there is just a fifty-fifty relationship between expressed at-
titude and actions.  
Thus, the idea of goal-driven behaviour has received a lot of bad 




itself identify the presence of goal-driven entities. This all changed 
with the breakthrough of Cybernetics, which by analogue to feed-
back-driven machinery paved the way for reintroducing purpose in 
dealings with human behaviour. Thus, a door was opened for the 
agency approach, and with the computer more intricate modelling 
of phenomena in the social domain. 
As an example of the latter, J. W. Forrester’s simulation technique, 
as depicted in his Industrial Dynamics , was a revelation to me as a 
student.100 With a few simple sets of interlocking discrete differential 
equations, I could model the effects of change across all sections of a 
manufacturing company. 
  His modelling technique was widely accepted and transferred to 
other areas, as illustrated below. 
Modelling the Tsembaga culture 
The example takes as its point of departure a classical tension within 
the social: The puzzle of whether man’s beliefs and social life are 
shaped by biology, culture or Gods. For one, Feuerbach expressed 
the materialist ethos most eloquently with his “Der Mensch ist, was 
er isst” (Man is what he eats).101 Man is a product of his material cir-
cumstances as his pupil Marx also taught.  
This inspired Roy A. Rappaport to search for a functionalist relation 
between the religious rituals of the Tsembaga tribe in New Guinea 
and their ecological conditions.102 Or, as he put it, rituals may not 
just relate to the internal constitution of a given society on its own 
terms as a culture, but also to external realities, as Comte en-
visioned.  
The Tsembaga grew yams and sweet potatoes and also raised pigs 
within a geographically limited area.103 The pigs ate the same food 
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as the people. Yet, there was a taboo against slaughtering them, as 
they were so useful for uprooting and softening the soil and thus 
preparing the ground for planting. However, the area could either 
nourish around 400 people and very few pigs or far less people if 
the herd of pigs became too big. When this eventually happened, a 
Kaiko was introduced, a feast of warfare with neighbouring tribes, 
dances, mass slaughter of pigs, reconciliation, encounters with 
spirits, eating and mating games.104 
Based on estimated values for input and output of food, given the 
number of people, pigs and the land cultivated, two students under 
J. W. Forrester developed a dynamic model for the interrelations 
between man and pigs, see Figure TSEMBAG 1.105 
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FIGURE TSEMBAG 1:  
THE INTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS WITHIN THE TSEMBAGA SYSTEM  
 
 
The model depicts the interrelations between the different ecological 
parts of the Tsembaga pig system. How the growth of the “human 
population” and/or the “pig population” triggers an increased need 
for “intensity of cultivation”, which in turn may increase “food pro-
duction”, although within certain limits as “yield per acre”  conse-
quentlywill fall. Thus, in the end, the “pressure” for a Kaido mounts 
and should be expected to be released, as illustrated by the next 
figure. 
 
Now, with the proper ecological values for the variables, the com-
puter produced the following simulated model of growth and de-





FIGURE TSEMBAG 2: 
WHEN TO EXPECT THE EMERGENCE OF THE KAIDO FESTIVAL 
 
  
The model depicts that – if the people are to survive – a Kaido will 
be needed approximately every 11th year, which in fact cor-
responded nicely with the actual figures. 
The model thus depicts how the pig festival and the subsequent 
warfare may emerge as something, which the system analysts will 
call an “automatic control device”. Yet for the people involved, the 
Kaido is a festival loaded with what outsiders would call religious 
meaning, including spiritual interventions. 106 
 
While the model makes a rationale for when and how the Kaido 
emerges, it does not depict when and how the curious custom of ta-
booing a more modest ongoing slaughter came about in the first 
place, thus foregoing the second criteria called for by Durkheim for 
a full explanation: the genesis.  
                                           
 




Just as the robustness of the beehive is due to the “ingenuity of the 
individual bees” of detecting the jobs not done by others, the Kaido 
emerges as an assurance of the survival of the tribe, even though the 
Tsembaga themselves are unaware of the ecological dynamics un-
ravelled by the – in this case materialist – ethnographer. Yet this 
materialist analysis did at least offer a testable, strong explanation 
for the occurrence of the Kaido.  
Nor could the model include, or at least it did not include, the po-
tential threat to the social fabric posed by the arrival of the “white 
man” – with his Christian outlook. They destroyed it by banning the 
warfare and sexual excitement associated with the Kaido. Thus, the 
model was only of temporary value. Just like a thermostat cannot 
close an open window through which cold air is streaming into the 
room! 
Towards a definition of explanation in the strong sense  
– An extension of the Positivism of Durkheim 
In its simplest form, explanation is defined as a rule of inference for pre-
dicting concrete events, including an account of opus operandi (the ways 
and circumstance in time and space when the rule is expected to apply). So, 
as circumstances do change, we have to expand our repertoire of 
explaining beyond the sheer lust for expretation of what did hap-
pen. 
Let us repeat the premises. 
•  Explanation is associated with given laws for behaviour or at 
least law-like behaviour. 
•  But it is not enough to “demonstrate” that Y, given a rule R, is 
the outcome of (x1, x2.. xN) – or as we might say, it is – from an 
explanatory perspective – not enough to have found a probable 
or necessary antecedent stimuli. Although this will do quite well 
for an interpretation, we also have to  
o  Establish that the stimuli X – given opus operandi – is just 
sufficient for Y to happen. 
•  Next we have to be able to explore whether Y could also appear 




o  This might indeed be difficult. For instance, disappointment 
may lead to anger, yet anger may be due to other antecedent 
arousals as well.  
o  What “we” at least have to do is to ensure that we do know 
how to identify Y and X independently of each other. 
•  Thirdly, we should always – as taught by the father of Positivism, 
Durkheim – remember our need to know how the social is condi-
tioned and thus revere the historical dimension. 
 
Thus, to explain something in the strong sense within the social do-
main, we have to know 
•  The structure of what we look at and how it came to be (genesis), 
and we must also have 
•  Rules that enable us to deduce behaviour from the structure at 
hand and thus describe (or explain as some will say) how it func-
tions. 
o  Please notice: This definition is as relevant for social as it is for 
biological phenomena.  
In short, explanations should not only allow us to predict how, ac-
cording to circumstance, a person or an organization will move 
from “what” to “what”, but why and how. In consequence, evolution 
stands as the idiom for strong explanations: Predicting when and 
how a given structure will change if exposed to a given set of en-
vironmental impacts.107  
The question, though, is how far stronger explanations indeed are 
possible within the social domain.  
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Theories are generally under-determined 
As we have already mentioned above and referred to in Figure 
OE.1, page 63 WP Coming to T & T, any theory may be shaped on 
the basis of “data” which could purport several theories. Or as ex-
pressed by the Duhem-Quine thesis: “Theories are under-deter-
mined.108 There is always more than one theory consistent with a 
given cluster of evidence.” If this is a surprise, a counter example 
may be called for. Dreams are often over-determined, says Freud.109 
A dream is loaded with several elements, all supporting each other 
and thus pointing in the same direction.  
Scientific theories, however, are – as said – under-determined. First, 
opus operandi can be hard to state with sufficient clarity. More is 
hidden in support of a given theory than can be expressed, includ-
ing back-up theories, measurement technologies etc. Thus, statistical 
analysis must, implicitly and by definition (see page 71) always be 
under-determined, but so may snapshot case research. Let us look at 
what this entails by means of an example:  
Let us say that after due research in a number of theoretically sam-
pled companies I dare to make: 
o Claim 1: Conversion to employee ownership will initiate a trail of 
employee participation initiatives, as documented by the inner 
developments of Company C1, C2, …CN during period P1, P2,…PN 
While you have made:  
o Observation 1: One or several employee ownership companies 
did not introduce any particular participation initiatives from 
year Y0 to YN 
Thus challenged, “I” will – out of respect for the paradigm of ana-
lytical generalization, see page 19 -> WP In Case of C, have to be 
more precise. Given your observation, “I” may make the following 
partial, theoretical prediction: 
                                           
 
108 Pierre Duhem: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1890), Princeton University 
Press, NJ, 1954, ref page 180-95 & 208-18 




o Claim 1.2: An employee ownership company without any particu-
lar participation initiatives may be found. This may either be due 
to management having not yet seen how they could benefit from 
“joining hands with the employees” and relaxing their ideas 
about the need of management control, or 
o Claim 1.3: It may be due to the fact that the union does not want 
to give up its traditional role as being the party that speaks on be-
half of the workers and thus does not want to hand over control 
to the employees 
o Claim 1.4: Both management and union may agree that they 
know best and thus they should come to terms rather than have 
the employees running around fighting for their own half-baked 
ideas. 
I may even have some evidence to support either claim, as well as a 
fifth: 
o Claim 1.5: Employees are not really interested, because Claim 
1.5.1: They are not equipped for decision-making.  
In addition, “I” may have some mixed pros-and-cons, evidence-
based claims: 
o Claim 1.2.2:  Some managers may indeed try to stick to their old 
paradigm of keeping control as may some union leaders, while 
other managers may engage small groups of employees in 
trouble-shooting sessions without making much fuss about it, 
neither 1.2.2.1: telling the CEO, nor 1.2.2.2 the union about it. But, 
yes, I will still make the claim: 
o Claim 2: In due time, activism will become an integrated part of 
an ownership culture, although I may make some reservations 
concerning the type of business, educational level of employees 
and the market served by the company.110 
 
                                           
 




Partial, contradictory evidence may either lead us to i) let our initial 
claim go or ii) send us on an endless trail of “rescue missions”, first 
identifying and next eliminating possibilities not contained in the 
original more far-reaching and generalized Claim 1. 
Now you might say that the original Claim 1 should specify that it 
can only be expected to be valid on the conditions set by the sup-
plementary claims listed above. True! And this is certainly at-
tempted in the original text.111  
But I am sure the present demonstration can also be taken to illus-
trate that 
1.  The list of potential partial contra-evidence to a given claim 
may be endless and thus the whole point of stating what can 
generally be expected to be true will never be within our 
reach. But instead of giving up, I believe we should try to: 
2.  Be as precise as possible 
3.  Be careful not to make too sweeping statements and  
4.  Be aware of the circumstances under which the original claim 
was formulated. Or in short, try to honour the “who, when-
where-how” and the “in-which-perspective” dimensions! 
With these not very assuring statements, let us proceed and explore 
whether it is indeed possible, in practice, to honour the quest for 
stronger explanations within social research: 
Functionalism and Structuralism reconsidered 
Classical Positivism calls for functionalist descriptions of institutions 
as they originate, change goals, grow or wither away as the society 
around them changes. A mid-level model! Within such a frame-
work, the inner feelings of the men involved will be seen as a conse-
quence of the prevailing changes, as taught by Structuralism.  
Yet – according to the realist ethos – all that does exist is us, the 
people. “We” – as agents – are the makers and carriers of insti-
                                           
 




tutions. So while functionalist “explanations” do try to unravel rules 
for predicting how, e.g., companies may change as their environ-
ment changes, they do not leave room for exploring how this is pos-
sible. The level of analysis remains at mid-level. Thus Functionalism 
and Structuralism in general, have the appearance of being weaker 
explanatory systems.  
Obviously, statistical generalizations, as we know from the more 
vulgar Positivism, are as inadequate as any after-the-fact functional 
interpretation. Yet none of these approaches is without value as they 
may make some implicit potential patterns explicit and thus help to 
sense or at least give us some ideas about what societal tendencies 
may be at work around, within as well as through us. 
This finally brings us to a far more serious challenge to even the best 
practices of functionalist interpretations: “We can certainly make 
guesses and retort to intuition! But what we cannot do ‘is to deduce 
structure from behaviour’”. Sure, one may imagine a structure that 
can, in theory, release an identified trail of behaviours. Yet what oc-
curs may have many other antecedents depending on circumstance.  
To explain and thus predict long-term structural change — e.g. 
within the IT industry – is complicated enough. But to predict how a 
certain company may react to the enactment of stricter regulations 
within the EU may be even harder. The outcome will depend not 
only on the position of the company within the market and its 
financial strength, but on how this is perceived by members of the 
board. For an illustrative case, see Robert Miles and Kim Cameron’s 
study of how differently the six major US tobacco companies coped 
with the tougher US laws for their market operations.112 
Interpretation is, thus, just pseudo-explanatory in the sense that it 
derives the emergence of events from an inferred structure. When 
the result is known, anything can be “explained”, be it by referring 
to “real” or possibly imaginary causes through rhetorical juggling. 
 
                                           
 




In contrast, explanatory models for, say, company and future politi-
cal performance have to build on both structural insights and 
knowledge, or at least some trajectory of evidence of how key play-
ers might react to challenges, including a sense for when and how 
they might be replaced by others. An ideal that might seem too 
cumbersome to honour! Sure, that is why it is an ideal! 
This leads us on to the upcoming section on Emergence, where we 
will explore whether it may be possible to sketch an outline for such 
a programme. But in order to do so, we first need to resume our 
presentation of some of the methodological demands to ensure the 





EXPLANATORY STUDIES AND THEIR VALIDITY 
Arguments in favour of explanatory designs 
Theory test design 
Interpretative schemes are backward-looking, trying to make sense 
by e.g. outlining a reasonable background or even a set of alleged 
causes for “why” something has changed as it appears to have done. 
Explanations are forward-looking, trying to identify what is going 
to happen if we do such and such. Thus, interpretation is a chal-
lenge to make what we know fit, while explanation challenges us to 
test whether what we believe we know can be trusted. 
While interpreters are likely to opt for a favoured reductionist ap-
proach in the simplifying mode, strong explanations should try to 
identify what might be expected when several lower-level inter-
active flows merge. 
Unfortunately, strong social theories are more an ideal than an 
established art. We are generally only able to establish weak theories 
based on a mere phenomenological basis, retroductions or simply 
conjecture. Thus, “theories to be” might very well develop due to an 
initial interpretative idea, which is then put to the test. Thus, the ex-
planatory idiom – in contrast to an interpretative endeavour – could 
be seen as an expression of one’s willingness to put one’s own ideas 
of coherence to a reality test.  
Yet, identified rules may always be subject to change as people may 
simply alter their performance as a counteractive protest to the 
sheer postulate that their behaviour seems to be rule-driven. How-
ever, this may, in some instances, be foreseen too; if so, then we are 
operating with a dynamic model113.  
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The challenge of bounded insight 
One might even debate whether explanation is possible at all within 
social research, because 1) we cannot believe to have a sufficient 
overview of what is going on, neither outside nor inside even our-
selves, or 2) it may be impossible not only in practice, but in principle 
as well. If so, we have to question whether Social Science is more 
than a phantom. Perhaps.114 We shall later return to this calamity.  
For now, let us simply say that we cannot do without rules in prac-
tice. Farming, parenting etc. would not be possible if we could not 
identify recurring patterns of change and stability, as taught by the 
Greeks. Yet the weaker they are, the more we should expect them to 
be like proverbs. 
Yet ideas – however scantly documented by means of evidence – 
may be hard to give up. Thus, even if a social rule works for us, we 
should refrain from the temptation to take this as confirmation of 
what we do know. Success may have been due to circumstances that 
remain partially hidden for us. Yet it is always tempting to use a 
somewhat verified theory as an explanatory scheme without proper 
qualification. And certainly many of the interpretative schemes with 
which we have dealt in the previous sections of the present essay 
may be seen by some of their proponents as explanatory. 
Explanation, thus, has to be handled with a care unknown to sense-
making, which mainly serves to give the speaker a feeling of being 
knowledgeable. Thus, explanatory schemes will not only contain 
rules for what to expect, but references to opus operandi as well as 
links to other theories. Yet what is tested is never – as stated by Du-
hem – just a proposition, but also an agenda of supporting theories, 
including means for measuring the key components of the theory 
under scrutiny.115 
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Thus, the ideal of taking Science as the ideal for social research 
should not – as has too often been the case – be seen as a call for 
simplification of terms and methods, nor for objectification of man. 
Scientists and social researchers may both claim whatever they want 
to be true. But with a difference! Scientists have to subject their ideas 
to experiments whereby they run the risk of being “undercut” by 
nature. Social researchers though are – as Durkheim remarked – far 
more likely to get away with their particular views on the meaning 
of life, the inner workings of society, nature of man etc. It is 
probably more a question of who you might convince. 
So, whereas natural scientists nurture an idea of progress within 
their domains, social researchers are far more likely to continue to 
study and converse with the old masters, including Aristotle, the 
Sceptics, Germanic Philosophers of the late nineteenth century as 
well as the great American psychologists of the early twentieth. 
The wide and open arena of social perspectives may tempt us to be-
lieve we have to choose amongst them. So students may be guided, 
if not outright forced to take a given set of theoretical approaches for 
granted  in order to, say, pass exams.116 Thus, intensive fieldwork, 
based on respect for informant feedback is – if not the only – then at 
least a compelling antidote that could guide us unobtrusively to 
challenge our own thinking habits and lead us on a search for en-
richment rather than simplistic precision. Sense-making simply has 
to be exposed to the structured discipline of reality testing.  
In this light, the problem with interpretations is the inherent general 
disinclination to set up experiments to check either their validity or 
their range of trustworthiness. The best may be true in the sense of 
throwing light into a corner of human life, yet their adherents usu-
ally over-expand the range and depth of their convictions. The les-
son from Science is the profound obligation to 
•  Establish a possibility for matter – and in the case of social re-
search, humans to respond, and thus when our preconceptions 
may be insufficient, refute them. 
                                           
 




With this final word on the inherent weaknesses of interpretative 
practices – however delightful they may be to commit oneself to – 
let us now continue our presentation of the challenges of explana-
tions. 
From “objectivity” or objectification to the call for completeness 
“Being objective” is the most famed claim of the social researchers, 
who try to present themselves as if they were as detached from the 
matter they study as our colleagues within the hard Sciences. Yet, 
objectivity is generally not defined in a positive sense. The idea is 
usually illustrated metaphorically by impressions acquired through 
vision (see page 11 WP Coming to T & T, rather than by corporal 
sensing such as smell, touch or even listening. The priority of sight 
might be stated as a call for “seeing things as they real are”, which 
by implication states “seeing what is, as things”. 
Otherwise, the most common notion of “objectivity” is to define it 
negatively as being subjective in terms of not:  
•  Being emotionally attached to a particular theory or cause and 
thus – if attacked – not being tempted to go into a defensive 
mode, nor being caught up in attacks on other schools of 
thought. 
•  Orchestrating your work in ways that could be for particular 
interests or even serve powerful persons or institutions. 
•  Being deceitful out of e.g. convenience in the handling of “data”, 
for instance throwing those out which – however awkwardly 
and for whatever reason – stand out from the rest. Please refer to 
the inclusion dogma, see page 99NN<-. 
 
Although I am in favour of making whatever can be measured 
measurable, we have to admit that most events in the social domain 
cannot just be expressed in the form of numbers. Yet in order to ap-
pear scientific, social researchers may be tempted to objectify social 
realities, for instance by looking at us and scientifically treating us as 
objects, as exemplified by Behaviourism. Or they may forego all as-




in certain areas of the brain. Or they may even fake it, as illustrated 
in Figure MOTHY, page 234NN<- 
In passing, we may note that some types of interpretative sciences 
have made a comparatively exaggerated claim: “Subjectification” ac-
cording to which truth is basically rooted in the thinking of the in-
dividual thought (idealism) or the social domain in terms of 
language.117  
Both approaches as exaggerations are of limited value and mainly 
formulated in order to reject the approach of opponents. 
 
I do not know whether anyone has ever defined “being objective” in 
a positive sense, i.e. in terms of what one should aim for. But I will 
gladly offer a positive definition: 
To be objective is – as a positive guide for action – linked to being as 
realistic in the sense of being as truthful as possible, i.e. 
•  Constantly striving towards perceiving an area chosen for study 
under as many perspectives, including angles of interest, as 
possible. 118 
o  To which one might add “…in order to enable us to predict 
what will happen if we act in such and such a way”. But I am 
not sure I dare to! 
Thus, by implication, reductionism, see page 57 WP Coming  to T & 
T, is to be seen as being adversarial to the very idea of being objec-
tive, as would perspectivism, see page 99, WP Modes of I, objecti-
fication and subjectification be. The claim for completeness as a 
valid criterion should simply force us to be as specific as possible 
about opus operandi as to when and where we expect a rule to be 
relevant as well as with respect to sense and measurements when 
possible. 
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The reason why “objectivity” is in quotes above is semantic. “Ob-
jectivity” is all too often linked to a sort of thinking which, at best, 
must be called mechanical. In order to bypass your alleged subjec-
tivity, let a chosen theory guide you to, what ought to be measured 
and how. Gather your “data” accordingly and subject them to logo-
mathematical analysis, preferably by computer. Thus, objectivity is 
linked to keeping your distance. Very well, indeed! But one does not 
forgo one’s own subjectivity by denying one’s responsibility for 
what one is doing, in case of committing oneself to a given theory. 
Explanation and the call for reliability, including a 
fundamentalist call for ousting interpretations from social research 
Explanation and interpretation differ radically in terms of ethos: 
o Exponents of explanatory designs have as their basic tenet that 
both “data” generation and analysis ought to be as independent of 
the researcher as possible.  
o Exponents for interpretation should ideally take responsibility 
and thus, by implication, be conscious of 1) their own role and 
inner movements, 2) struggling to be aware of what their 
presence means to the Other.119  
If it was not for the fact that many interpreters are inclined simply to 
opt for a given view as explainers, it may seem that the interpreter is 
to be given the upper hand. Thus, it is essential for me to stress that 
the claim for independence originally grew out of a rejection of the 
rights of others, religious authorities in particular, to determine, 
what others rightfully should believe. It should be up to the indi-
vidual himself to unravel what is true, but up to us all to test 
whether his findings could be acted out as such.  
 
Thus, an essential validity criteria for an explanatory study is: 
•  Reliability, the ideological denial of privileged access in favour of an 
expectation that any other researcher doing the same work 
                                           
 




under the same conditions could arrive at the same results and 
thus has a right to know how the study was set up, where and 
when. 
This implies that we, rather than opting for either objectification or 
subjectification, should combine the ethos of both. 
•  Train ourselves to:  
o  Be as sensitive as possible, striving towards completeness.  
o  Make what can be measured measurable.  
o  Try to make sense of and respect what cannot be measured. 
o  Strive to see how we, ourselves, may be influenced by 
language and other structuralistic impacts and thus constantly 
differentiate between what may be and what we can only see. 
o  Hesitate before accepting the claim that what cannot be 
brought to be seen by everyone cannot be “scientific”.  
o  Be aware of the challenge of putting what we are inclined to 
believe to the test. 
Construct validity: Correspondence and operationalism 
One of the most striking differences between interpretation and ex-
planatory approaches is the weight which the latter – in order to 
measure – imposes on operationalization, see page 105 WP Coming 
to T & T, or explification of how key terms are to be measured.   
In order to honour the reliability principle, we are expected to go to 
the greatest lengths possible to state what we intend to measure and 
how we have chosen to do so. If not, how can we expect others be 
able to compare our findings with theirs across distances in time 
and geography. Thus, with the presentation of our findings, we 
must do our best to outline the meanings of the central terms cho-
sen. The demand for constructive validity! 
Thus, the way forward is gradually to learn first to apply and per-
haps later, to develop such schemes of “translation” as refined ex-





Figure CORR:  
SCIENCE USES RULES TO TRANSFORM  








in form of 
symbols, sentences and/or numbers 
(Measurments)
potential for cheque before or after experiment
CORRESPONDANCE RULE
Tranformation without any assumption of
of strucural likeness
 
In research, rules for description, including measurements, are 
needed and effective like cookbook recipes which list what in-
gredients to use, how and when. Yet as is the case for cooks, you 
still have to have some experience acquired through training to ap-
ply them with skill. Thus, we all have to learn gradually first to 
apply them and later to develop such schemes of “translations” our-
selves as a refined extension of common language. 
 
There can hardly be expected to be a one-to-one relationship be-
tween measuring and reality, as documented on page 44 WP 
Coming to T & T. Our ways of measuring social realities can at best 
be seen as a matter of circling around a supposed phenomenon and 
thus suggesting ways of identifying it. Let us take an example: 
An example: Measuring “emphathy”  
An investigation of managerial competences called for a definition 
of 15 factors chosen for identification of qualities of typical and ex-
cellent managers, respectively. One of them was empathy, for which 
the following operational definition was chosen: 
“Empathy”, being the intent to understand others, is indicated when 




o Understands the strength and limitations of others and the 
reasons for other people’s behaviours, e.g. knows what specifi-
cally motivates or de-motivates other individuals, 
o Accurately reads or interprets the moods, feelings or nonverbal 
behaviour of others, or 
o Listens to others by asking questions and waiting for their reply 
or taking the time to allow another person to describe something 
at her own pace and in her own manner.120 
Please note that the above-mentioned indicators have to be identi-
fied either by asking the people of whom the manager is in charge, 
or by observing her interaction with others. The results do not de-
pend – like laddering – on what a certain manager says about her-
self, but on what the subjects in her care say about her.121 Thus, it is 
not by interviewing a manager, but through the fieldwork that the 
researcher must translate observations, feelings and experiences of 
individuals into text for cross-comparative analysis. 
In this case, the research revealed that “Highly effective managers 
showed more interpersonal sensitivity than typical mangers did”.122 
If so, a preference for and the ability to try to understand others 
matter. Furthermore, listening as a fore-runner for reflection is most 
likely to be a powerful antidote to group-thinking. see page 29 WP 
Coming to T & T.123  
Now if empathy is to be chosen as the major subject for an investi-
gation in itself, the list of dimensions would have to be expanded, 
including 
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•  a grounded exploration of who uses the word “empathy”, how, 
when and about what.124 
So, what is crucial for researchers is to establish rules for translating 
observables into text in a way that is open for others to follow and 
check. 
“Operationalists” even go so far as to make the exaggerated claim 
that “the way in which entities are defined and thus measured de-
fines their meaning”.125 An idea which, however attractive, if fol-
lowed would empty our language as an expressive tool for poetic 
vision as well as bar any attempt to come to terms with what we do 
not yet understand. 
As already touched upon in the first chapter, page XX <- words can 
only show us a direction, they cannot tell it all. Empathy is like love, 
you know it when you meet it. The social cannot fully be captured 
with words alone. It gains reality as it is lived.  
Yet words give us at least an idea of what we are trying to talk 
about, thus the drive for precision still remains an important guide-
line in social research. Let me illustrate:  
To define, say, temperature as what you measure with a ther-
mometer is pure nonsense as the following statement shows: “g-
ness is what you measure with a G-meter”. Sure, but it does tell you 
what g-ness is. We have to have a reference to what is spoken about 
to make sense out of any of the operational definitions. It is only be-
cause we already have a sense in our body of what temperature is 
and – as above – what empathy may entail as a social practice, that 
we can accept the definitions. Thus, it is a good analytical joke to de-
fine intelligence as what is measured by test batteries intended for 
the measurement of intelligence.  
Construct validity is a call for adequate translations of our sense of 
the real into guides for measuring, and thus always debatable! 
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Construct validity and the reality principle 
Construct validity is a question of a good fit between what you want 
to measure and the means you choose for doing so. Say, for in-
stance, you want to “measure” employee satisfaction. If so, would 
“degree of absence” be a good measure or even a valid indication of 
what you are interested in? 
One should be able to demonstrate that what one has defined and 
the item measured covers what one wants to measure. This is often 
most difficult to ensure. But, if you do not measure what you pre-
tend to measure, the rest is meaningless. In so far as you use a set of 
misguided definitions of keywords, your subsequent generaliza-
tions will be based on sinking sand.126 
Inside the lab you can define keywords as you find best, but when 
you enter the lived worlds of others, you cannot expect all to follow 
your favourite definition of say “influence”. Quite the contrary! For 
the case researcher, it is essential to establish who means what, 
when they state they do or do not have influence.  
Influence is not something that one just has. Thus, even if I – e.g. in a 
survey – state, yes “I” have influence – others may not have the 
slightest idea about what I have, only what I feel “I” have or how I 
like to present myself. Thus, the “yes” is not about my relations vis-
à-vis the world. It is an emotional response camouflaged as saying 
something about my relations with the world. It is only when I state 
what I feel that “I” have an influence on, or even better, when I offer 
the interviewer examples of when and how “I” may have con-
tributed to a solution, that she can begin to establish her own scales 
for measuring influence according type and degree.127 Next she may 
go into the field and explore whether others agree or whether I 
simply live in my own world of make believe. 
Thus, construct validity has to be supplemented with a realist ethos: 
one has to distinguish at arm’s length between 
o How we talk about something and  
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o The something we claim to be talking about 
Internal validity 
When “data” have been generated – or gathered, as explainers pre-
fer to see it – what they mean has to be presented in a condensed 
form, be it trough analysis and/or process. And this, like the meas-
uring process, should ideally be a process, which others can see and 
control. 
This is easy in that we simply have to deal with data in the form of 
numbers, which lend themselves easily to being processed in step-
by-step operations without any interference from the whims of the 
researcher, be it identification of correlations between clusters of 
“data”. 
But, and there has to be a “but”. Correlation and identification of 
clusters are just like descriptions and, thus, without any explanatory 
value in themselves (see page 17). They have to be interpreted to 
make sense. 
Statistical “analysis” simply cannot unravel the potential links be-
tween antecedent events and their probable consequences. It can 
only indicate how often B followed A during a certain period or de-
gree to which they showed some co-variation. Statistical analysis 
only describes. Thus, the potential relations indicated that are pre-
sent may at best – by the researcher – only be converted into weak 
rules.  
But within the restrictions given, one cannot stress often enough 
that studies based on fact expressed as numbers score high on inter-
nal validity, whereas case studies based on interviews, observation 
and texts do not.  
In qualitative research, both the generation of data and how we 
“process” them depends on i) our sensitivity for the Other as we ask 
and observe, ii) the theories with which we are familiar and thus by 
inference those of which we are not aware and so on iii) our inge-
nuity to develop analytic generalizations. And iv) who knows 
where the ideas come from that captivate us as we work with the 





External validity (1) 
Explanation is about establishing rules for inference. This is the 
question raised by the call for external validity: Can the results of a 
particular investigation be applicable to other domains? E.g. can the 
results from a study of “employee ownership” in the USA be trans-
ferred to other companies operating outside the USA, with a less 
prominent, say general, entrepreneurial culture? 
The less attention that is given to opus operandi, the easier it is for 
proponents of explanatory studies to assume that an uncovered re-
lation can be generalized. An expression of the belief that behaviour 
of man is not just law-like, but actually bound by law! 
In so far as we dare to dispute the assumption of law-based be-
haviour, explanation within the Social Sciences might, in principle, 
appear as an impossible venture. But only if we stick to one–level 
reasoning: Say – based on observances – you have identified a set of 
rules by which you can and, in fact, have been able to predict my 
actual behaviour. Now you may inform me about it. I may either 
agree or try to and perhaps succeed in changing my behavioural 
patterns and thus prove you wrong.  
Yet helping people to identify their more or less automatic and at 
times dysfunctional reactions, learning to cope with them and fa-
cilitate them in trying to change their behaviour accordingly is ex-
actly what all physical healing is about. Increased awareness opens 
the door for personal growth. 
 Secondly, social life shows a lot of regularities. We have long 
learned to expect the daily newspaper or books ordered to be deliv-
ered, just as I expect my darling wife to kiss me “good night”. But, 
of course, any newspaper owner may decide on a lock-out, just as 
the TV technicians may go on strike. And even though most of us 
are law-abiding, there will always be those who will turn to crime. 
But we may predict who are in the greatest danger of doing so. 
Thus, we ought at least to take “the striving towards identification 
of laws for inference” seriously as a research ideal.  
Thirdly, there may even be sets of universal, higher-level social laws 
for how beings like humans arrange each their social world under 




sality per se. But the degree to which we can outline circumstance in 
all its historical and geographical specificity as well as when a given 
structure is likely to emerge. Unfortunately, this call for specification 
of opus operandi is violated by most case studies, social experi-
ments and statistical analyses. It is simply close to impossible to 
state the contingent conditions for the emergence of any social 
world that surrounds us! 
If so, we must learn when and how to trust our sense of reality, 
when and how we may use results uncovered by others as a guide 
for our own tentative attempts to improve the conditions we face. 
The validity scheme for explanatory studies 
Allow me to bring this brief presentation of validity issues together 
and present the traditional validity scheme, known to most stu-





Figure STEXP:  
STANDARDS FOR GOOD RESEARCH:  
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Generalization as a practical challenge, external validity (2) 
The final note in the previous section may, for some, be too loose to 
be acceptable, so let us take a moment to look at external validity 
expressed as a quest for generalizations in social research as in the 
Natural Science: 
There are laws, thus we may even foresee who might tend to break them, 
when  
First, let us note that we are given guidelines for how we ought to 




tions for proper behaviour. The first is given to us through law 
making, the latter through our playmates, parents, superiors and 
colleagues.  So we may, perhaps without much awareness, adapt to 
or struggle with them. If so, it would be worthwhile to begin to 
identify the potential circumstances that make some “social laws” 
wither away and new ones emerge.  
Generalization – as a lived practise… 
In principle, generalization within the social domain will always 
hinge on interpretation. When used for planning, we should play it 
safe and recall how the validity of any claim depends on the fit and 
range of opus operandi at the time the law was formulated and 
now. 
Thus, responsibility for the use of generalization is two-fold.  
•  The researcher herself is responsible  
o  for making the foundation for her claim as lucid as possible 
and thus 
o  not over-extend the opus operandi for its expected validity.  
•  The researcher is, however, not responsible for the use of her 
findings. 
Thus 
•  It is the responsibility of those who exploit lessons learned from 
other sites to evaluate whether the results can be transferred to 
other places in time, for instance from a hospital ward in 
Northern California to one in Jersey.  
… and according to philosophical rationality  
Finally, let us look at a philosophical challenge, an extension of the 
Duhem-Quine Thesis (see page 76), which could concern us: 
•  For any given set of observations, the more rules and thus theo-
ries can be deduced, the less respect is paid to the inclusion 
doma (see page 25 WP In Case of C  
•  Thus, empirical contra-evidence cannot be expected to force any-




All we can do is to do our best and be aware. However, we do need 
guidelines! Luckily, experience shows it can be trusted. However, 
unfortunately only at certain times! So we better play it safe and as-
sume that social theories at any level cannot be taken for more than 
rules of thumb, although hopefully the best are more valid than 
proverbs! 
This finally leads us to extend the former positive definition of ob-
jectivity (see page 11-14, WP Coming to T & T. 
•  Objectivity: A sophisticated, self-conscious awareness of the plu-
rality of circumstances, which may have led to the emergence of 
what we look at, coupled with 
•  a playful ability to place what we look at within different sets of 
specific perspectives.  
It takes reflection and ever-increasing sensitivity to circumstance, as 
well as awareness of the inherent resistance within the observed to 
be distorted and/or simplified to awaken our sense for our own 
limitations and obtain a sense for the real. 
 
Whether and how this may be achieved will be the subject of the last 
section. First, we have to finish our treatment of explanation and try 
to see how we can pay our respect the two fundamental dimensions 
of social research: The need to integrate present acts with the condi-
tions set – or the historical dimension with day to day agency  
 
 
Emergence means  
complex organizational structures growing out of simple rules 
Robert B. Laughlin128 
EMERGENCE 
Within social research, we hardly face any challenge greater than 
emergence: How to derive social behaviour as well as its derivatives 
                                           
 




as facets of culture from the actions of those who carry it, embedded 
and bound as “we” are within the institutions around us – as well as 
by our own personal history and visions of what would serve us 
best? Is it even possible to combine such a bottom-up level of action 
with a partially top-down setting of circumstance?  
Or in programmatic terms: to combine structuralism and agency! 
And if it is impossible in principle, how may we do so in practice? 
Because we have to! It is a task that organizational designers con-
front every day.  
So “emergence” – as a combined approach oftop-down scene setting 
and constructive bottom-up agency – has been with us long before 
the concept itself “emerged”. So let us start with an illustrative ex-
ample. 
An alleged example of emergence, however speculative 
As an example of emergent theory-building committed to the ex-
planatory paradigm, allow me to refer to Holbach and his charm-
ingly naïve claim for enlightened egoism.129  
The baron starts his oeuvre by refuting all prevailing social ideolo-
gies: “All too many despise realities and will rather give themselves 
away to all sorts of imaginary interpretations”. So it is no wonder 
that the man is unhappy.130 We may even be guided by wrong ideas 
to counteract our own interests, as e.g. soldiers are led to act on the 
belief that the honour of their nation is worth their lives.  
The problem is that we do not look for what triggers our inclination 
to act, he states. And we certainly do not trust traditional authori-
ties, be it the church or governmental figureheads! The model he 
particularly wants to warn us about is described in Figure 
CONNAP_GD_HOLB. 
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Figure CONNAP_GD_HOLB:   











According to Holbach, 
the traditional Chris-
tian model conceives 
man as a potentially 
evil creature, that – at 
least if he wants to be 
saved – must adapt 
himself to follow the 
commandments as 
they are stated by Je-
hovah and/or the love-
thy-neighbour-message 
by Jesus.  
 
that we must realize that we are selfish, rational “thinking ma-
chines”. 
 
Although some think they know better, man is no different from 
anything else, Holbach states. All that exists, man and beast in-
cluded, is just matter in movement. What we do is the result of an 
interplay of laws acting on and within us. “I” may assert that I have 
a free will, but what I want is determined by my constitution, like 
apples fall when the stem breaks by a gust of wind.131 And what 
drives man is his egoism. 
But as he says next: In order to get along, we do need others to help 
us. And thus if we reflect a moment, we have to acknowledge 
others. Consequently, the enlightened egoist must realize how we all 
are better served, if we all help each other, please see Figure: 
CONNAP_X.  
 
                                           
 




Figure CONNAP_X:  








of daily life, 





biological drive for 
self-preseverance
Man 







Holbach’s line of 
thought is based 
on the idea that 
man as a biologi-
cal being is an 
egoist, like some 
today see our be-
haviours as 
driven from a 
concept of the 
“selfish gene”.  
Yet – according 
to Holbach – we 
are rational be-
ings too. Thus, if 
we reflect, we 
should acknowl-
edge how it is in 
our own best in-
terest to behave  
with social courtesy to others and thus help foster a civil society. A 
conception in accordance with present-day “rational choice theory”! 
The arguments of Holbach explicitly thrive on physicalistic (mecha-
nistic) metaphors like attraction etc., thus paying his respects to the 
dominant natural philosophy of his age, Newtonianism.132  
In passing, we may note that this conception of “rational” implicitly 
presupposes the idea that “thinking can direct behaviour”.  
 
Apparently, Holbach – as a spokesperson for the Enlightenment – 
wanted to replace the power of the clerics with a rationally balanced 
judgment conceived in the idiom of Mechanical Science.  
Finally, we ought to mention 1) that although Holbach in principle – 
as a physicalist had to be – is a determinist, he does not believe that 
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man is necessarily able to foresee what will happen. The tiniest 
events, he says, may lead to unforeseeable and significant conse-
quences. Nor do we necessarily sense all that acts upon us, when it 
does.133 
But unfortunately for Holbach, he did not realize that 2) a trail of 
thought is not explanatory just because it refers to a Science, be it 
explicitly or metaphorically. The endeavour of Holbach is as sim-
plistically expretative as other models of the same family, including 
the one developed by the younger Freud. Man is neither rational nor 
driven solely by a chosen inner force. 
Yet both models contain a kernel of the same truth. Yes, “we”, in 
order to be accepted socially, have to curb some of our inner im-
pulses to steal, offend, take short cuts etc.  
Both models, though partially true, are simplifications. Thus, it is 
hardly surprising that their respective emergent views of society dif-
fer. Freudians are led to view “society” as a suppressive force op-
posed to our alleged appetite for gratification, sexual and otherwise, 
while those who follow Holbach opt for the emergence of a more 
civil society, which we can learn to exploit as a potential source of 
self-gratification. Thus, the difference of outcomes reveals the in-
adequacy of both models in accordance with our indication of how 
grand interpretations tend to exaggerate and simplify, see page 93 
WP Modes of I 134. So by accepting any of either, we may be prone to 
commit the fallacy of assumed concreteness!  
What interests us here is, thus, not the inadequacy of Holbach’s 
model, but the fact that it 3) so beautifully exemplifies the very idea 
of emergence, that society is to be modelled bottom up by rule-
driven actions released as agents encounter each other. 
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Is society prior to the individual  
- so apart from the social whole - the individual does not exist at all?  
Or .. is it the individual alone that exists and the social .. a mere abstraction?  
Alfred Schutz135 
Emergence – A concept of the Natural Sciences too 
Emergence has, as already stated, been with us longer than the word 
itself.  
In Natural Science, Boyle’s law stood for a long time as a prime ex-
ample of emergence. It states that the pressure of a gas held in a 
closed container will increase with temperature: Gasses consist of 
atoms that move back and forth, bumping into each other and into 
the walls of the container. When heated, the movements increase, so 
the atoms bump more often into each other as well as the walls. 
Consequently, the pressure on the walls of the container increases 
with the temperature.136 Likewise, if the enclosure is diminished, the 
number of bumps on the walls increases too and thus the pressure.  
In either case, despite chaos on the lower level of atoms, order – ex-
pressed as pressure – emerges on a higher level. Just like our macro-
scopic world seems so orderly, despite the fact that the atomic world 
carrying it is dominated by unpredictability. So as B.L. Laughlin 
says about emergence: “In a world with huge numbers of parts, the 
usual thing is not complexity, but its absence”.137 Look around and 
see how organized nature is with its layers of earth, its bi-sexual 
flowers, skeleton structures of mammals like that of reptiles etc. 
Stating that something is complex is just saying that it appears so to 
us. It does not say anything about reality, neither the natural nor the 
social sciences. The expression “it is too complex” is just a cover-up 
for what we do not know as if it is the fault of something outside 
our grasp that we do not master it! 
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As a last historical example, we may mention that the idea of emer-
gence also is a part of the traditional debate, concerning the charac-
teristics of living and dead matter. Historically, physicalists claimed 
that the living in general and mental processes in particular were 
the outcome of nothing but physical processes, while vitalists 
claimed that the living was imbued with something unique, at times 
called spirit.  
Physicalists, however, were in trouble. They could not demonstrate 
how the mental emerged from the physical. They just stated that the 
latter is supervenient  on the former, which to me is an example of a 
conceptual cover-up.138 They defended their position by stating that 
their position was acceptable, as natural scientists could not derive 
the transparency of water, H2O, from its atomic structure. Thus 
some, like Popper, associated “emergence” with “non-predictabil-
ity”.139  
The reference to water though was a poor pick. Atomic Theory has, 
in fact, now advanced to the point where the colour of metals and, 
in this case, water can be derived. Yet, we have still to see whether 
they come up with a structural explanation for the old puzzle of 
why and how water expands as it freezes.  
So I think we had better take the position to associate emergence with 
predictability: rules for deducing what performance we can expect to 
emerge at a higher level based upon the behaviour of its parts, 
either when stable or as parts of it or the environment around it 
change.  
Pattern creation through bottom-up by close-range impacts 
Americans speak of queen bees, the girl who is the “leader of the 
pack”, emanating a confidence of her own, which sways the other 
girls in her circle to follow her whims. The metaphor is interesting. 
It says a lot about what we believe social life is and how we believe 
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it works, but it says nothing about the behaviour of social insects in 
general, nor of queen bees in particular. 
Amidst all the orderly conduct of the swarm of labourers, the queen 
has absolutely no say. Oh yes, worker bees continuously “nurse” 
her with nectar, pollen and water. But she “herself” is “just” an “or-
gan” for laying about 2,000 eggs per day in the high season, corre-
sponding to her own weight in eggs within a couple of hours.  
In comparison, the life of the worker bees is far more “interesting”. 
As they mature, they will maintain more than a dozen jobs, starting 
with cleaning cells for a day or two, next they begin to feed the 
larvae for a week, then produce wax etc., until after three weeks 
they will leave the hive to become foraging bees for another three 
weeks until they finally – after a short stunt as guardian soldiers – 
die. 
Of course, the worker bees are as “pre-programmed” as the queen 
is. But that is not the whole story. The jobs undertaken by “indi-
vidual” bees may change not just during their lifetimes, but during 
the day. Should, say, a disaster – like a sudden bout of heavy sum-
mer rain – destroy a lot of the forager bees,  some younger bees will 
jump ahead in their programmed life cycle and replace them. Just as 
older bees may go back and clean cells, if required.  
How is this change of jobs possible without any forum for central 
consultation, or any overseer? Well, however complicated, the 
worker bees “watch” or rather sense what “needs” to be done as 
well as what the workers next to them, their neighbours, in the hive 
are doing. Thus, the “individual” reacts to the immediate internal 
need without having even the slightest means to sense the overall 
situation.140  
Thus, the seemingly organized behaviour of a swarm or rather a 
body of bees – like colonies of ants – is the outcome of a dozen 
lower-level composite rules guiding the “acts of individual” mem-
bers. Or as John H. Holland states: “The rules describing an indi-
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vidual ant’s repertoire may be few, the complexity of the colony 
emerges from the large number of ants and their coupled inter-
actions with each other and the environment”. A concept he ex-
pands on as part of the our inner workings, too : “In this, the ant 
colony has much in common with a neural network, where the 
flexible behaviour of the whole depends on the activity of a large 
number of neurons, described by a relative small number of 
rules”.141  
Furthermore, Mitch Resnick developed the StarLogo program of 
mathematical equations for mimicking the organization of groups 
such as ant colonies and the v-shape of flocks of birds, traffic jams 
etc.142 Later, these ideas led to the programming that defines the be-
haviour of avatars leading to endless interactions.143 Just like the ten 
rules for moving the six chess pieces leads to endless variations of 
games. Or, with reference to “the invisible hand” of Adam Smith, 
we can now see it is not just invisible, it does not exist. The emergent 
order of liberal society is due – not to any top organizing principle – 
but to the diligent behaviour of individuals, who observe what their 
fellow beings are doing. Thus, the most observant detect needs and 
opportunities as they occur. 
Models of emergent social behaviour 
Realizing how seemingly complicated worlds can be constructed 
with a few rules, like the bee hive, ant colony or computer games, 
one may wonder to what extent social behaviour, too, can be 
modelled bottom-up based on a few rules. 
Allow me, first, to present a crude sociological sketch of emergence 
in principle. And to finish of with a few observations from compa-
nies as they become employee-owned. 
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Segregation of neighbourhoods 
The following illustration of emergence, how cities may evolve, is 
indeed a simplification – even more simple than those for the be-
haviour of bees and ants. Schelling set out to explore how segrega-
tion or integration can result from individual choices, just as “grey” 
and “white” agents react to each other’s choices given various initial 
mixtures of them.144 One result is shown below, see Figures SCHELL 1 
AND 2. 
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Figures SCHELL 1 AND 2: 
EMERGENT PATTERN RESULTING FORM A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS 
1 
 
An initial random distribution of 
lots 
The white and grey dots repre-
sent lots occupied by either W or 
G agents.  
Now suppose a set of different 
situations involving varying 
preferences of W or G for living 
close to some of their own kind. 
Say G wants to live close to at 
least 5 of his own kind, or some 
Gs having this preference, and 
others do not. If you allow the 
individual agent to move, you  
may wonder whether the individual moves will result in what in 
our eyes will have the appearance of more structured and, thus, 
higher-level order. 
As an example, suppose both Gs and Ws share the preference that at 
least half of their neighbours ought not to be of the other kind. Thus, 
at least 46% of the Gs and 53% of Ws in figure 1 will be unhappy 
with their lot. 
2 
 
The adjoining figure 2 shows the 
emergent patterns formed after 
one string of moves starting at 
the centre as one agent after an-
other is allowed to move and 
settle in accordance with their 
preferences.  
After everybody has done one 
move, not all, but at least 90% 
will now be living with the type 
of neighbours they prefer.  
If allowance was made for a 
second move, an even more  
 
rigidly structured pattern would emerge. However simple, the 
model illustrates how order may crystallize bottom-up rather than 





Models – like Schelling’s – can grow in assigned complexity. The 
mutual influence of the agents on each other depends on the dis-
tance between them. Also stochastic variations in intensities of 
drives may be introduced etc. The outcomes are thus not only un-
predictable, but may often depend on minute variation of weight 
assigned to influences. 
With reference to the previous FIGURE CONNAP X, page 265<-, the 
model for the Schelling simulation may be depicted as in FIGURE  
MULAG below.  
 
Figure MULAG EMERGA 4:  
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The multitude of emergent be-
haviours due to interactions of 
rule-driven agents may be de-
picted in a multi-level scheme 
like the one presenting the so-
cietal consequences of Hol-
bach’s simplified notion of 
man’s “nature”, ref pages 279-
80<- .  
   If so, man is seen as a driver 
of change as new opportuni-
ties set within a given prelimi-
nary structure occur. After a 
period of interactions has had 
its run, a new stable structure 
emerges. Man has recreated 
his world. 
   Thus, while periods of sta-
bility may occur, they may 
only be temporary. 
 
According to the emergence idiom, laws at an analytically higher 
level are demonstrably derivable from laws at a lower level. An 
ethos that obviously is the opposite of reductionism! 
Thus, a Multi-agent Simulation combines structure and behaviour. 




the stage for rule-driven agents, which – as they interact – may pro-
duce a new, temporary, rather stable structure emerge.145 
Emergence as an analytical tool for social research 
The emergent patterns, like those shown in the previous figures, are 
gross simplifications of social action.146 In contrast to bees, ants and 
enduring traditional cultures, modern man is supposed to act along 
with, as well as react to, his neighbours, colleagues and relatives, 
due to a multitude of dimensions, e.g. his upbringing, work experi-
ence, the cultures of which he is or has been part and, thus, the 
framework provided by languages, technologies, visions of the 
godly and the historical events surrounding us. 
Consequently, if emergence is to be developed as a tool for social 
research, we need to aim not only for stronger explanations, but to 
develop “a synthesis of 1) structuralism – the idea that the individual 
is a pawn of socio-cultural circumstance, and 2) the integration para-
digm, the view that social reality is shaped by agents as individual 
actors in social interaction.147  
To this task we will now turn: 
Bounded emergence 
However beautiful emergence may be as a guide for social emer-
gents, we have to accept that even we  
a) Can foresee a range of emerging technological opportunities 
by technological forecasting as well as 
b) By futurology identify a range of agents that might be alert 
enough to look into them. It is still hard to believe we would 
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c)  Be able to predict who will succeed in exploiting them and 
how.  
I mean not even Bohr could foresee the enormous consequences as 
he set out to integrate Newtonian Mechanics with the idea of dis-
crete orbits of electrons to the Hydrogen Atom.  
Thus, we have to be humble. We may be able to see a range of the 
challenges facing us at any time, but not necessarily who, how and 
when they will be met and thus what will eventually surface. A po-
sition we can call bounded emergence.  
Bounded emergence thus combines  
o A top-down awareness that our acts are conditioned, but not 
necessarily pre-determined – the structuralist angle and 
o A bottom-up perception that reflection and individual drives 
move people as “they” try to shape and, eventually, in interplay 
with others, succeed in shaping their own future and thus, in 
turn, part of our future – the agency angle with  
o An awareness that our ability to explain, and thus foresee, is re-
stricted due to our limited sensitivity as well as restricted insights 
and oversights – the limited foresight angle. 
People react to large-scale events, as well as being bound by and ab-
sorbed in daily activities. To develop a full-blown complex, adaptive 
systems theory of man is thus beyond our present means.148 But we 
might at least try to develop structured guidance for how to handle 
emergence within the social arena. The task we now turn to: 
Towards (bounded) emergence in the social domain 
With reference to Comte, see pp. 9-10, and the concept of levels 
introduced in FIGURE LEVRAN, page 32, WP: Modes of Interpretation, 
we usually operate with at least three major social levels: 
                                           
 





•  The cultural level, the resource from which language, the trail of 
history, the world of infrastructure etc. are given to us at birth. 
•  The institutional level, which shapes the opportunities we may 
pursue as well as sets limits for what we can do without fear of 
retributions. 
•  The personal level, our private life – as we experience, shape 
and recall it. 
The cultural level sets a scene of prevailing senses of history and 
“values” like the present, undisputed acceptance of a limited form 
of democracy, the representative – the technologies surrounding us 
– a set of given languages with all their possibilities for expression 
of what can be stated through a given vocabulary for feelings, emo-
tions and/or passions (see WP Coming to T & T, page 36), as well as 
the inherent phenomenological structure of each etc. 
The institutional level sets a scene of prevailing law, institutions, 
ritual patterns –  like speed limits, courts of law, marriage customs. 
Of course, marriage customs may be perceived as inherent in the 
cultural, yet one can within cultures that otherwise look quite simi-
lar still find different marriage customs, as e.g. Hindu societies. 
Thus, culture sets a stage of options for the institutional level, but it 
may not determine what a given society has opted for. 
Likewise, the institutional level only sets the stage for individual 
agency. How to act is up to the individual, shaped as he may be by 
biology and upbringing. Thus, prevailing laws, implicit or explicit, 
for acceptable behaviour do not prevent either crime or disruption 
of marriages, unfulfilled expectations etc. But awareness of the in-
stitutional arena certainly allows us to predict what might happen 
to someone who breaks a code. 
This perception of our situation may, in principle, be seen as deter-
ministic as it respects the ethos of structuralism, but in practice it is 
open, as we have to recognize that 
o Individual agency will lead to changes at the institutional level, 
but due to limited foresight we will at best only be able to see a 




As institutional changes accumulate, they can in due time have an 
impact on the cultural level, see to Figure: EMERGA 
Figure: EMERGA: “EMERGENCE”  
AT INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL ACCORDING TO EXPLORATIVE INTEGRATION 
 
CULTURAL LEVEL: Language, Heavy prevaling tendencies, etc
Political & industrial
organization, 

































Our perceptions of the real as well as the desirable are conditioned by 
conceptual images bestowed by the languages of different professions we 
learn to master (Structuralism), as well as on how other agents may act 
and shape their immediate environment and thus in consequence may be 
our institutions. And, further as new institutions run together, even re-
shape part of our culture! 
Social developments – although driven by men as opportunities occur – 
cannot be perfectly predictable in detail as we cannot foresee who will 
jump to and achieve success by taking advantage of one of several options 
as they appear from day to day. However, this does not mean that ex-
planatory models are practically impossible. But we should at least be 
somewhat modest in our claims regarding how much we can explain and 
what we must leave open for interpretation.  
Thus, we should not claim to able to explain without validation of evi-
dence at both the institutional level (outcome) and the individual level 
with a respectful regard for opus operandi at the cultural level too. 
The number of levels needed for an analysis is something that has to be 
decided for each individual case. For instance, “Immediate close-range 
impact” often needs to be split up in at least two parts: personal face-to-





Three or more levels? 
The three-level structure of a cultural, institutional and individual 
agency should only be taken as illustrative. In practice, and at least 
for organizational research, three levels of analysis are not enough. 
Even some individuals – such as heads of state or firms – are often 
perceived as having a personal institutional impact on most of us as 
decision makers, even if they can only act in consort with others. 
Just like we, on the personal level, hardly achieve much without the 
interacting support of and inspiration from others. Thus, we have to 
inject at least an additional level – social-psychological level of interac-





Figure EMERGA 2:  
ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCE WILL OFTEN CALL  







Past              Present      Future
Scene sat



















Close range social impact
 
 
The idea of three levels (cultural, institutional and individual) as sug-
gested in the previous figure is a gross simplification. Contemporary 
organizations can be structured along different lines of, say, internal 
cooperation, which the employees will be more or less free to follow 
or – if driven by their own sense of reality – be forgiven for breaking if 
the result proves it worthwhile. In the latter case, persons count more 
than social prescriptions, which in terms of the example set can cause 
new forms of cooperation to emerge. 
If so, we need to introduce a mediating level that will allow us to dis-
tinguish between personal close-range impacts and socially organized 
impact, due to prevailing patterns of cooperation, as depicted above.  
Thus, we would, in this case, have to operate with four analytical 
levels.  
 
With the insertion of a fourth level, we finally reach our final 
presentation of emergence as illustrated in figure EMERGA 3. But 
certainly the number and types of levels needed as an analytical tool 
will in any case depend on what you set out to explore. Just as some 
types will have to be specified in great detail, others – like the cul-




Figure EMERGA 3:  
A FOUR-LEVEL STRUCTURE FOR ANALYSIS AND 
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For organizational as well as social-psychological research, it is necessary 
– although not always sufficient – to introduce ”forms of interaction” as a 
supplementary level between the personal and the institutional levels.  
What emerges within a firm depends on 
The immediate action taken (agency level)  
As well as the conditions that have emerged over time such as patterns of 
cooperation and joint problem-solving skills (level of interaction) set as 
they may be within 
Sets of general administrative practices, including customer relations (in-
stitutional level) given 
The prevailing industrial climate, technological stage, laws of governance 
etc. (cultural level).  
The number of levels can be broken down even further.  
For organizational studies, “cultural level” as described above would cer-
tainly need to be broken down further in cases of e.g. cross-national 
studies, as economy and culture in general are partially independent.  
Just as agency may not be as evident to the researcher in other studies, as 
for instance interchange on some institutional levels specified in further 




Causes or rules? 
Taking a look at Figure EMERGA 3, it is evident how dangerous it 
may be to talk about cause in the social domain. What we eventually 
will see is determined by a string of precedent conditions as well as 
a forward string of merging phenomena, either of which is difficult 
for most to track in sufficient detail. Looking forward, we should i) 
just think in terms of rules and try to identify the conditions under 
which they have so far proven trustworthy as we ii) accept that 
whatever we believe in has to be under-determined. 
The higher the level, the more stable – usually 
It is generally assumed that structures at the cultural level are rather 
stable while those at the institutional level are more apt to change. 
The French Revolution did change the French language, but cer-
tainly did not alter it structurally. Nor was it changed to the degree 
to which the administrative practices, civil law and life were trans-
formed under Napoleon.149 So what we recognize as change is a 
matter of degrees. The closer and more involved we are, the more 
perceptive will we be of changes in the way youth behaves, in 
recreational life, religious and administrative practices or tech-
nology etc. Thus, researchers should be careful not to overempha-
size and make a tidal wave out of what, in hindsight, will be seen as 
a ripple. 
Yet great disruptive changes do occur, as with WWI and WWII. Just 
as the Russian Revolution was a “tidal wave” which at least for-
mally persisted for close to a hundred years before the new state of 
affairs resembling a civil society would once more hopefully 
emerge.  
If you will allow me to make a personal remark as a philosopher of 
ideas: As much as we may be guided by linear thoughts of change, I 
do believe we may benefit from thinking in terms of occurrence and 
re-occurrence. There is hardly any philosophical or political idea, 
                                           
 




hardly any concept of the good life or any idiom of the purpose of 
science that has not been with us since at least Ancient Greece.  
What changes is not necessarily the realm of ideas, but only the cir-
cumstances under which some are more apt to be given voice and 
accepted by particular classes of society. Thus – if I am to be be-
lieved – circumstance matters as much as, if not more than, sub-
stance.  
The lower the level, the more short-lived the occurrences we expect or… 
The perception of change depends not only on your ability to dis-
cern, but on how close it is. The closer we are to it, the more sensi-
tive we are to detail, just as we are moved by the people we meet, 
books we study, the lessons learned in associations we move in and 
out of etc.  
Likewise, patterns at the lower level are not just ingrained in rou-
tines of interaction; we may even be aware how they came about 
and the part we played in establishing a new organizational practice 
of teamwork or what the arrival of children did to our marriage. Just 
as we know they will be changed again as new people come in. 
Thus, a change at close hand seems not only unique because it is 
personal, but also ongoing. Whether and when this really is true or 
not is worthy of study in itself. It may very well be that we change 
according to patterns, which we share with others in the same 
situations. 
Emergent schemes of interaction as a quasi-independent reality in itself 
Prevailing patterns of cooperation encourage the people involved to 
organize their interactions in certain ways as well to constrain what 
they can do without creating a fuss. 
In a traditional firm, you are expected to go to the manager with 
ideas or complaints. If she does not listen or act upon “your” idea, it 
will most probably be, if not forgotten, then filed away. Or if she 
acts upon it, takes it further in the organization, she may never 
mention that it came from you. So you learn your lesson – which I 
have heard all too often on the floor – how members of management 




quence contributes to maintain the general atmosphere of passive 
complacency so common in traditional industry. Hopefully, this 
may soon be a thing of the past, as it is in employee-owned compa-
nies! 
Or, if the “manager” ignores your idea, you may find something 
you can turn into a grievance and bring to your union representa-
tive. If he acts on it, the outcome may go in several directions de-
pending on how it is combined with other complaints, thus leading 
to a new institutional practice. 
The illusion of social causality 
With reference to practises like those above, some like Sawyer state 
that “levels of reality-stable emergents have an independent onto-
logical status. They have casual powers that result in constraining 
and enabling effects on individuals”.150 Now this may generally be 
true as a sociological fact of statistics (institutional aggregated level), 
but not necessarily for an individual close-up case.  
This illusion of social causality may be due to several factors: 
Firstly, Western democracies, especially, are generally – like nature 
– dominated by order rather than chaos. If that were not the case, no 
one would invest money in pension schemes, post letters or see any 
reason for planning a future for the family. An order attributable to 
a certain degree of coercion! Postmen can not sleep as long as they 
might like. Employees do try to keep an eye on how often members 
of management meet with alleged customers on golf courses. We do 
have to honour prevailing norms in order to pass exams and obtain 
a desired diploma and, thus, land the most desirable jobs. Just as 
we, in order to stay out of jail, must refrain from being caught 
stealing. And true, my beloved expects at times to be brought 
flowers and receive other customary signs of my devotion. So there 
are laws we seem to follow day in and day out. Control is an in-
grained feature of civil society and thus directs us. 
                                           
 




Secondly, it is often forgotten how the structures of our languages 
emerged, including how they have changed over time. Just like not 
one in ten Danes has any knowledge of how our democracy came 
around. And those who believe they do know, do not necessarily 
agree on how.  
In short, the way our social world is organized is generally taken as 
the way we “accept” how government, industry and universities are 
organized. And sure, you are allowed to believe that nations should 
be ruled top-down like transnational companies or even universities 
should. But please remember that the social – even if it contains the 
natural domain – is something more! 
True, customs and institutions set the stage for how we interact, 
what we can talk about and how. Any existing pattern of interaction 
creates its own arena. Rules  “rule” worlds, whether they are ex-
plicitly written instructions or implicit, taken-for-granted ways of 
cooperation. They are not just real because we believe them to be. It 
is worse. They cannot be transgressed at first without dire conse-
quences! Nevertheless, they will be at some time and place! 
In principle, nothing prevents the agents  – as experience accumu-
lates – from changing either a rule or a practice, just as some words 
fall out of fashion and new ones are added as technologies or music 
styles change. Emergence through interaction can at times be an ex-
pression of a collective “learning” or “acquisition” process. New 
patterns – as they are created – are often associated with new de-
grees of freedom of action. Yet if they subsequently solidify into “in-
stitutions”, they too will become something “we” have to pretend to 
follow and thus become obstacles for exploiting new and yet un-
foreseen possibilities.151 
So even though language patterns, social mores and institutions 
have regulatory powers, they cannot have what some call causal ef-
fects. People do fail exams; poets do try to exploit the cracks in lan-
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guage in order to express what plain language cannot; people do 
commit crime; ideologists do fight governments and may at times 
break a pattern in order to – as they believe – make the world a bet-
ter place. True, they do so at risk, but if they succeed, they may very 
well emerge as heroes for a while. 
So even if people in general adapt and even if social norms and or-
ganized life in general seem to have one-directional power, they do 
not necessarily have to. We shape and are shaped by circumstance 
according to the illustration of the principle of social emergence as all 
ready presented in FIGURE EMERGA 3 on page 116. 
What emerges at any stage, e.g.: 
a) The agent level may – when accrued (combined) with other 
events – emerge as a new practice of interaction, which then – 
b) Once more when accrued with other emergents from that level 
– may emerge “upwards” and become institutionalized as well 
as  
c)  Setting the stage “downwards” for us, a cooperative practice for 
us to benefit from or succumb to “as we please”, personally.  
So even though we, like any structuralist will teach, are engulfed by 
the past, we need not be utterly swallowed up by prevailing tech-
nologies, ways of thinking or mores for expressing ourselves. Our 
interaction with others, personal background, ingenuity, emotions 
and sub-linguistic acts and reactions matter too. 
Thus, any case study of a company or a political association should 
pay as much attention to what shaped the organization in the past, 
the possibilities of today and the personalities that helped shape it, 
as well as those who run it presently.152 
Can causality as a concept of social power be more than just an illusion? 
So even though social causality is, in principle, an illusion, we had 
better recognize that it is more a matter of degree. There are, say, 
items one cannot move from A to B in practice without using a spe-
                                           
 




cific, historically now emergent means of transport, be it by road, 
rail or sea. And whatever your ideas about the ideal setting for 
family life, our grandchildren are, if not doomed, then in all practi-
cality forced to accept a life in one of the already existing houses. 
The scene is “always” set not just for one outcome, but several, be it 
realization of several forms of cooperation or individual choices. 
The prison system in Denmark may adopt a system like that of the 
United States of punishment and isolation of persons or the Cana-
dian approach of “self-awareness and socialization”. The choice will 
be up to the members of the Danish Parliament and thus, in turn, 
hinge on 1) the arguments and experiences referred to by experts, as 
well as on 2) how Parliament is presently composed and thus on a 
lot of other issues which determined how the Danes voted in the 
previous election etc. 
The law governing the emergence of a reform of treatment of pris-
oners will therefore eventually depend on a rumble of issues coming 
up from concerned agents, on how they are able to join together and 
present their visions as a group, as well as on the ability of their in-
dividual spokespersons to present their case and thereby appeal to 
cultural values.  
Individuals do matter. Yet neither “heroes nor villains” operate in 
their own vacuum.  Of course, their ideas may run counter to pre-
vailing customs (institutional level), just as what they try to accom-
plish may be stimulated by reading (images of alternative cultural 
set-ups), examples set by others as well as experiences encountered 
elsewhere (interactive and/or personal level). In short, “pattern-
breaking” may simultaneously be influenced by the push and pull 
from levels above the institutional, across it as well as from the per-
sonal domain.  
For the empirical researcher, the challenge is thus not only to 
untangle what drives the individual, but also when and how, as 
well as to determine which people are able to guide others to set and 
reach new shared standards – i.e. action research.  
Thus, whatever emerges within the scene set for the possible (see 
figure Emerga 3) depends on what occurs at the levels below and 




skills of individual people in presenting their ideas, and thus im-
plicitly on language.  
But do not be mistaken, prisons are real, and their means of control 
are real! You cannot make them go away by waving a social-con-
structive wand! 
 
Examples: Allow me to refer to two examples of the interplay be-
tween the personal and a scene set at the cultural level that made 
new institutions break through. Hitler is generally depicted as an 
isolated villain, yet he came to power as he, as a “political activist”, 
gave voice to wounded sentiments that the German people were 
betrayed at the peace conference after WWI by the Western powers, 
particularly the French. WWII would never have happened had the 
Europeans allowed Woodrow Wilson to pursue his quest for na-
tional self-determination! 
Nor was the success of Luther due solely to his theology, if at all, 
but rather to his ideological support for the ruling dynasties of 
Northern Europe to secure the vast land and riches of the Catholic 
Church to which they had long turned their eyes. 
Emergence sets the stage for longitudinal case research 
Even though Social Science is presently geared to study or even 
promote change, studies set up in the paradigm of emergence are 
hard to come by. It is as if the very idea of a student year after year 
studying the inner life of an organization runs counter to the ethos 
of “publish or perish”. It simply does not seems worth the effort 
when you consider you have to know beforehand whether the effort 
would be worth the time and energy you have to put into it. Thus, 
most case studies are short-term “looking through a window in 
time” studies of the life of an organization, probably with an eye to 
a particular incident.  
In contrast longitudinal studies is an opportunity to reach greater 
precision and an expanded over all view as evidence, set in time se-
quences, may be set within a frame of a multitude of short-term in-
terpretations. A fact I played upon when writing the Employee 




as snap shots – could lend themselves to a series of interpretations if 
used in isolation!. And of course I included bits of interpretations 
that were in contrast to my own as they emerged year after year.  
Secondly, it is indeed a particular privilege to have been allowed to 
conduct a five-year cross-comparative study of four to seven manu-
facturing companies in the USA as they became employee-owned. 
Yet, I have to admit that the idea of emergence was not explicitly 
stated as an integral aspect from the outset. The study led me to it.  
The idea of an emerging pattern of direction for employee owner-
ship first struck me in the second of the five years.  
One morning on the floor of Reuther Mold, it struck me that the in-
ternal life of this, the youngest employee-owned business, seemed 
to move in the direction of one of the oldest employee-owned busi-
nesses, Fastener Industries, in my bag. Later, the emergence meta-
phor came to blossom with all the more force as the most significant 
steps of structural or behavioural change in theses cases were driven 
as much bottom-up as top-down. 
Allow me, therefore, to reveal some events in the research process 
with reference to FIGURE EMERGA 4, a somewhat simplified version 





Figure EMERGA 4:  
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Case research within organi-
zations studies the conse-
quences of human interaction 
as it occurs. Yet a full model 
like the ideal depicted in 
Figure Emerga 3 will often 
have to be bypassed.  
   Researchers will often have 
to bypass a full-blown de-
scription of the past and take 
the temporary structure as a 
preliminary given fact along 
with the environment. Thus, 
only a few glances will be 
thrown back in order to ex-
plicate how different people 
perceive the situation in 
general and their own situa-
tion in particular.  
 
Emergence exemplified by a few finds from the “Employee Owner”154 
Introducing employee ownership in a hitherto capitalist-owned en-
terprise must, to outsiders, to look like a revolution. Well? After 
having receiving the stock certificates on a Friday afternoon, the 
employees return the following Monday morning. And everything 
looks the same as always. The items at your machine to be 
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processed are as you left them, as are the orders on your desk. Nor 
have the organizational structures and administrative routines 
changed. The only perceivable change will be in your perception of 
yourself. Now, you have legally become an owner. 
Apart from a few expretative sketches based on what the older em-
ployees could tell me, I could not give a full account of the past. I 
had to take the structure of “yesterday” as a given fact, as illustrated 
by Figure Emerga 4. Yet the glimpses thrown back were very useful 
and not the least instrumental as a clarification of both the reason 
and the starting point for the introduction of employee ownership. 
The past matters, and it did matter so much that without a descrip-
tion of that and the present structure, it would have been impossible 
to make sense of what was to emerge and how. The past was to 
“determine” what would come easy to some companies and why 
other companies facing similar challenges could remain stuck for 
years. 
Workers in companies with a past of horrendous worker-manage-
ment-union relations waited for a long time before they took any 
initiatives, and actually had to be dragged into them by the CEO, 
whereas companies with excellent worker-management-relations 
just glided into participation without much fuss.  
As stated, I visited and revisited the same eight companies four 
times for two months over a five-year period. So allow me just to 
give a few glimpses of the benefits of doing cross-comparative 
longitudinal studies:  
During my first year, it was led to identify at least three different 
types of reactions amongst the employees at most companies, the 
ACT typology: 
Some workers had met weekends before the actual legal introduc-
tion of ownership in order to discuss what to do. The first morning 
as legal owners, these activists came to work and began to restruc-
ture their workplaces. They dealt with issues, which for years had 
been in need of improvement, but had been neglected by manage-
ment. What an amazement to many of the other workers, the com-
placent, who just held their breath in anticipation of how manage-




baffled and were met with irritation by some managers. The im-
provement initiated by the activists could be seen as a threat to their 
perception of themselves as the one “who knows best”, an attitude 
shared by a few workers who were also identified as the tedious. 
I am very tempted to give an account of all the games the tedious 
managers played in order to convince themselves of their superior-
ity. These accounts were probably one of the reasons why a Danish 
reviewer said that the book was as exciting as a crime story. But we 
have to skip that in order to present one example of a collective, 
emerging change. 
Other managers, though, were thrilled; the activism was what they 
had hoped for. And yes, the aroused activity did lead to friction not 
only between, but within departments, as initiatives at one site 
along the production line by implication put a demand to those 
further up the line to change too. Just as those further down the line 
would be annoyed when those in front demanded something more 
of them. As frustrations grew, management in cooperation with 
concerned workers had established a committee for coordinating 
any initiative suggested by groups of managers, workers or, as was 
later to emerge, joint problem solving teams. This committee, which 
soon became institutionalized as an “internal board”,155 was repre-
senting all of the efforts for internal renewal and interface coordina-
tion of company performances. This explicit structural innovation 
was in many companies enforced by training programs in problem 
solving techniques. As people went through these, a shared bottom-
to-top culture of approaching challenges emerged. Everybody sim-
ply by implication came to live by the same terms in dealing with 
administrative, communicative and technical matters at stake. 
During the first visit, I was so captivated by the doings of the 
activists, and thus my first draft – given to everybody in each com-
pany – was devoted mostly to their backgrounds, doings and atti-
tudes, including their annoyed attitude with the complacent “who 
just held back”.  
                                           
 




Coming back a year later, I was given a lesson. Just as I stepped onto 
the factory floor, an older worker came running to me. With my 
draft in hand he pointed to a particular page and said: “This is 
wrong. This is wrong, we are not passive.” And he told me why he 
had not applied for cross-training or joined “problem-solving 
groups”. He would not stand in the way of the young who had a 
future in the company while he was due to retire within a few years.  
As I explored the issue further, I realized that the seemingly passive 
group of employee owners were indeed an asset. They had simply 
become a sounding board, checking all the ideas coming forward 
from the activists as well as the tedious. Thus, they helped the com-
pany to avoid wild goose chases. This role of the passive – as it 
emerged – had obviously slipped passed me the first time around. 
But there was more to come: 
In the third year, I interviewed a younger worker who had talked to 
me before. He now presented himself as an activist. But as I con-
ferred with memos from “problem-solving groups” and the workers 
around him, I found out that although he was liked for his general 
support of the ESOP – he was by no means an activist.156 Thus, in a 
short-term view he was – if not outright lying to me – then at least 
eager to present himself as an activist to me and presumably to 
others too. This might indeed look like a trifle. But in the longer per-
spective, it showed me how the activists had emerged to become the 
idiom of what it meant internally to be an employee owner. A dis-
covery, that was to be confirmed bythe instructions given by the 
seasoned employees to new employees. 
A "nerve-racking" election and the dawn of a company ethos 
The election to the board of Fastener in 1987 was exceptional. Seen 
in retrospect, the incident came to acquire symbolic importance. It 
defined both the personal values, which ought to guide your be-
havior as an employee-owner. 
                                           
 




Sales had been declining for months. Thus the traditional philoso-
phy would be to downsize production to safeguard equity, which 
any student of management knows, as did the treasurer. But Fas-
tener was now employee-owned, so the board decided to ignore the 
treasurer and continue production, slowly building up an inventory 
of parts, until it finally equaled five months of production. 
“But now as an esop, labour is a fixed cost", as plant manager Jim 
Carroll stressed, not even considering the - at least theoretical - pos-
sibility that some of the owners could have been asked to leave. But 
to the accountants, "it wasn't good money management for them". 
The treasurer was concerned, because "all the money that was going 
into raw materials would be better going into loan payments."157 So 
there was a clash over "differences of management style - a differ-
ence of opinion about how the company should progress".158 
As the election drew close, the treasurer went around talking only to 
the older employee owners in possession of most of the stock. If 
they would vote for him he would guarantee that not only would 
they not be laid off, but they would be given possibilities of ad-
vancement, say be trained to work with IT or sales. He probably ex-
pected to become CEO himself. At least he informed me that "many 
employees were coming to him saying: “You ought to run the com-
pany“".159 In short he played politics staking his chances on the most 
powerful voters. Rich, on the other hand, went around and talked to 
everybody. 
"It was either him or me. Let the employees decide", Rich said. 
"We've got a problem that I can't solve. The only facility available 
for solving it is the owners themselves." 
The employees had to choose. And they were terrified; it was as if 
the whole future of the company was at stake. "Oh, it was terrible. 
There were people shaking like a leaf."160 "It was really tense, almost 
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like each man for himself."161 “ It was nerve-racking", as several of 
the workers recalled.  
As it were, the treasurer was voted from the board and resigned. "A 
lot good technicians fail as politicians", he told me.162  
Now the emotional strain people had lived through too had conse-
quences. It showed how playing politics was not acceptable. You 
have to be straightforward and neither play games nor try to hide a 
mistake you happened to make. This paved the way for a new im-
plicit culture of painstaking honesty. It had a depth that amazed me, 
just unlike the values some company managers one Monday morn-
ing present to the world as their vision of company performance! 
Values – as far as they exist – are the personal norms we live by, not 
just declarations. 
The effect of the intangible 
I had several reasons for wanting to study employee ownership, 
both personal and professional. For years, I had studied how the in-
troduction of new technologies led to organizational changes. Now, 
I had become curious to see whether an intangible change may have 
an effect too, and if so, what.  
Thus, the study was undertaken as a study of potential mentality 
change as well. This perspective helped me to better contain the at-
titudes of the complacent. For those at the bottom of the company 
totem pole, complacency is generally the best strategy. Just obey and 
learn the company’s three-line vision statement by heart and repeat 
it if needed! And keep your private thoughts to yourself etc. In 
short, do what is expected, but do not necessarily have your heart in 
it. Just pretend! Thus becoming part of and responsible for the com-
pany was for them quite a revolution they had to get used to. 
As the companies matured as ESOPs, I asked the managers to tell 
me how they tried to adapt to and if possible encourage employee 
activism, as well as whether the workers had changed. Oh indeed, 
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they had. As employee owners, the workers had as employee own-
ers become more responsible. Yet this was not how the workers per-
ceived themselves. After having asked them first to tell me how 
changes in workflow, quality control, accounting etc. were coming 
about, I asked whether they had noticed any changes amongst man-
agers, their colleagues and themselves. Oh yes, they said, we care 
more.  
It took a long time before I realized the important difference be-
tween “care” and “responsibility”. Initially, I saw the two collections 
of statements as mutually confirmative. But then – as I looked back 
on the whole process that I had lived through alongside my in-
formants – the discrepancy between the two concepts and thus the 
significance of care dawned on me. The workers had always felt re-
sponsible; but before, it was not so much to the company as to 
themselves as a collective, represented by their union representa-
tives.  
Now, after years as employee owners, they had come to care about 
the company, their jobs and their colleagues. The evidence was 
overwhelming. They had come to embrace their machine, their daily 
working life and their co-workers within the same bracket as their 
car, their private belongings and family. After five to seven years as 
legal owners working together, they had grown to care for the com-
pany as a whole. 
And it had and an even greater perspective. Because what is the 
USA after all if not a capitalist country. And as one person said: 
“Now I had finally become one myself. So now I feel like a ‘real’ 
American.” 
The “Employee Owner” and the image of “man’s nature” 
Referring back to Figure EMERGA 4, I have to acknowledge that - 
like most case researchers - I did not initially pay much attention to 
the issue of man’s nature. Nor did I discuss whether it – like ghosts 
– has a reference to anything beyond being a concept of language. 
Initially, I just relied on my implicit knowledge of analytical, per-
sonal, social and industrial psychology. But the most relevant and 




at the very end of the study. A step I took a step in order to make 
sense of, in particular, the ACT typology. In this case I was – in-
spired by Bergson, see page 59 WP Modes of I– led to perceive man 
as a creature who, within a social setting, strives for individual 
competence. And if he could not achieve that, he would “tediously” 
try to fake it, lie and dabble in covert politics and thus potentially 
hurt others. 
Emergence in the social domain, a last remark 
Emergence is a question of not just making theories fit as a specula-
tive endeavour, but of testing their sustainability. Thus, the con-
structive idiom emergence does for explanation, as what reduction-
ism as a simplifier does for interpretation. 
With reference to the quote from Schutz (see page 95), the idiom of 
emergence further shows us how individuals matter as much as the 
socially given.  
The tension between the interpretative and the explanatory 
approach 
The challenge of sophistication 
The old Greek Master, Thucydides, the scientist-philosophers of the 
Enlightenment like Holbach and lastly, the founders of Positivism, 
Comte and Durkheim, all formulated their specific programme for 
explanation as an antidote to mere interpretation. Now data should 
rule. So-called scientists should no longer be led by his emotion 
and/or beliefs to impose his own inner world on the outer. Data 
should no longer be defined and selected as we like, but gathered in 
a neutral spirit. Just as the results of the subsequent analysis should 
be! We should thus come to know how sets of identified parts are 
interrelated without any reference to how we would like the world 
to be organized. And, after we have set the stage, we should surren-
der to a passive and, at best, naive stand of letting the world “say it 
all”. This is certainly not bad as an ideal. The problem is whether the 
denial of one’s own presence is the best way to assure the call for 




And indeed, interpretations in general are often expressions of sub-
jectivity, as we should be well aware of. Thus we are - in the more 
self-conscious interpretative mode- taught to reflect upon how and 
what catches the interest of our “discerning eye”. In short, we 
should not look around without being aware of our own back-
ground. We must nurture a sense of what we are able to grasp, how 
our focus is a result of the theories we have read; just as we should 
be aware of the possible impact of our interactions with those we 
study. Looking around may at best lead to active interventions, just 
as the family doctor after a proper diagnosis is better able to de-
scribe a wholesome cure.  
In this way, both types of inquiry may in a more sophisticated mode 




Figure IES:  
CAN EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION  




From a more simplistic 
view, Interpretation as 
Subjectivism consists 
in reading oneself into 
the world.  
    In contrast, the ex-
planatory approach 
calls for us to objec-
tively let the world be 
read into our con-
sciousness, as the Na-
ïve Realist assumes so 
simply. 
Yet neither interpreters nor explainers need to be that naïve. Both 
positions can be more self-conscious and thus sophisticated. 
    First, the interpreter can very well be aware and even suspicious 
of her pre-dispositions and thus ready to reveal and challenge them 
by experimenting with different interpretations of the phenomena at 
hand already during field work. 
    But this is a position that explainers may adapt under the um-
brella of e.g. Critical Realism: We look for rules, but we too have to 
look at how we look, because language is not rich enough to capture 
reality in all its richness. Consequently, I need to be self-observant 
as well in order to test and develop a more complete perception of 
the perceivable. 
 
Nor should one ever forget that like the best explanatory studies 
extend beyond the worst interpretative studies in ingenuity, so do 
the best interpretative studies outrank the more pedestrian ex-
planatory studies in sensitivity. 
And as we have seen, the identification of rules within the social 
domain is quite a challenge, if at all possible, in as far as we oblige 
ourselves to respect the main characteristic of the social in contrast 
to the physical – i.e. the historical dimension. If not, expretations 
often get the upper hand. Interpretations creep in through the nu-




tistical analysis can alert us all to new insights despite our predispo-
sitions, as can comparative case studies. But in order to make sense 
of identified correlations, we have to fall back on interpretation. 
An effort to design a combinatory approach may thus be a more 
fruitful approach. This is the move to which we will now turn. 
 
Explanations must be based on description, while description in it-
self must be guided by language, customs, as well as specific ex-
pectations of what it might be worth looking for. In short, explana-
tion hinges on interpretations of relevance. Thus, it might be fruitful 
to see the two epistemological stands as an interwoven fabric, a 
continuum of sense-making and foresight rather than as contrasts, 
as suggested in Figure IDEP. 
 
Figure IDEP:  
FROM INTERPRETATION TO REALITY TEST 
AND HOPEFULLY A MORE ENCOMPASSING SET OF THEORIES 
____________________________________________________________ 
















An image of social research as expansive process: Beginning with 
interpretations as premises to which new insight is added due to a 
willingness to test and explore reality. 
The figure is an argument for the application of at least two types of 
sources for inquiries: 1) A personal, based upon experience, reading 
and other ideas conveyed through language, acquaintances and 
small-scale learning cycles and 2) the design of experiments and/or 
case studies in a open-ended, partially self-confrontational manner 
allowing for breakthroughs in accordance with the reality principle.  
Or in short: Do not take sides, but let your research be guided by 
double-edged curiosity. In how many ways can the world be per-
ceived and how can I – for the benefit of others – learn to perceive it 




The idea is that as you move forwards and build up notions and 
rules , you also look back to explore what the premises may exist for 
your rule-making. 
If social research is at an immature stage, is there a way forward? 
At times, we hear that the alleged feeling of inferiority which some 
social researchers have towards our field – as compared with the 
progress of Natural Science – is because it is a relatively young field 
of research. This is not the case! Applied social research was a well-
established discipline in ancient Greece when natural phenomena 
were still only awed and subject to religious terms. Actually, Natu-
ral Science came into being as philosophers wondered whether 
natural phenomena could be rule-driven like the behaviour of citi-
zens.163 
The problem is, rather, that many social researchers, firstly of all do 
not pay sufficient attention to history as a fundamental distinction 
of the social. Secondly, strong explanations as a prerogative are 
weakened and thus give room for correlations of limited or, worse 
still, just temporary substance.  
Thirdly, since social research has become a profession as well, many 
have been tempted to pave their way through the system by coining 
terms of their own rather than thinking in terms of working together 
as stonemasons once built cathedrals. Unfortunately, the defensive 
safeguarding of our own limited perceptions often gets the upper 
hand rather than listening to and integrating the insights others may 
have to offer.  
Fourthly, the notion that the social domain is more complicated than 
the natural is all too often used as an excuse for the ad hoc expreta-
tions, rather than seen as a challenge to aim for in attempts to un-
cover how, when and why structural changes not only do occur but 
perhaps even has to occur. How can we ever believe in the idea of 
the potentiality of the emergence of Social Science if we “blame” our 
field for our own lack of overview. It is not the social domain that is 
                                           
 




too complex. It is we who still lack both the words and the wisdom 
to contain it! 
In order for social research to move towards becoming an explana-
tory science, the emphasis must be expanded from correlational 
studies and experiments in the lab to real-life studies, i.e. case re-
search, with a high degree of awareness of temporality, openness in 
terms of what different theoretical positions may have to offer and 
consciousness of how they might be integrated as a practice. 
Towards understanding 
We should never forget, that even though it is within our grasp to 
objectify the Other, we are not objects, however much we may at 
times be subject to changes we can hardly recognize. Yet, the more 
we look, try and test our beliefs, the more meaningful, expansive, 
self-predictable and joyful can our lives become.  
So several questions remain: Can we really believe ourselves able to 
contain the Other as well as others amidst our myriads of relations? 
How can we approach the Other – as we must – in partially subjec-
tivist mode and really see what we share and how we differ beyond 
identification of the behavioural rules by which the Other seems to 
abide? 
For answers, we will have to look at understanding, the third ap-
proach to social research, which claims that we have privileged ac-
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